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Nongovernmental organisations working with refugees have traditionally used a top- 
down, emergency relief approach. This type of assistance reinforces the idea o f refugees as 
passive, apolitical beings that have no rights as citizens during their displacement. This thesis 
argues that such an approach is inadequate and that refugees are indeed necessary change agents 
in dealing with the conflicts they currently face as well as those that have led to their 
displacement. It is argued that organisations working within a participatory development 
framework are more able to encourage refugee action. This framework, based on the ideas of 
Korten and Macdonald, incorporates ideas o f empowerment-based participation and 
programming that facilitates just, sustainable and inclusive development action. This framework 
is used to evaluate NGOs that are working with the more than 140,000 refugees on the Thai- 
Burmese border. The types of NGOs examined are international and local NGOs, including 
refugee-run organisations. Field research conducted in refugee camps on the Thai-Burmese 
border in 2000 as well as observations and experience while in 'Diailand from 2002-2004 
provided the data for this study. The findings were that international NGOs with official 
mandates to provide relief assistance in the camps were most restrained in their ability to engage 
refugees as active participants through their programming. Agencies such as the UNHCR also 
fell into the top-down relief model and focused most of their attention on negotiations with 
government bodies. More successful in engaging refugees were the largely unregistered local 
NGOs working primarily on Burma issues and treating the problem of displacement as one of 
many addressed by their programming. Capacity-building programs as well as solidarity linkages 
led to many refugee participants beginning their own refugee-run organisations. These 
organisations are an important and positive step in the struggle for citizen action by refugees from 
Burma both now and also later when they will be tasked with the responsibility of rebuilding their 
communities in Burma.
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C h a p t e r  O ne
E n g a g in g  R e f u g e e s  a s  C it iz e n s
Political turmoil within and between states has contributed to more than twelve million 
refugees this year alone claiming asylum outside their home country. Non-govemmental 
organisations, acting with the permission of host governments and often as implementing partners 
for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), assist refugees during their 
time of asylum, meeting basic needs and helping to ensure their survival until they return home, 
or are integrated into a country o f asylum.
Due to constraints placed on NGO programming by host governments and the common 
conception of ‘refugee’ as passive and apolitical, a top-down, relief-oriented model has 
traditionally dominated refugee assistance. In addition, refugees often remain in camps for 
extended lengths of time, making long-term relief programming the norm.
Examining the concept of ‘refugee’ it is clear that as individuals forced to flee their 
homes, they are assumed to have forfeited their rights as citizens upon their departure. Refugee 
programming based on a relief agenda reinforces the lack of citizenship o f those in exile. This 
type of programming results in refugees without the power to make decisions about the most 
basic of life choices: where to live, where to work, what to eat, where to send one’s children to 
school. Beyond the immediate, another effect o f top down programming is the inability for 
refugees to ''contribute [their] instructed judgement to the common good. ’ Defined as the role of 
‘citizen’ according to Laski, refugee contribution (i.e. participation) is ultimately required for 
transformation of the conflicts that led to their displacement.
Participatory processes in the field of refugee assistance have recently become the 
identified ‘missing link’ needed to engage refugees, particularly by nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs), which are specially situated for this role. Combining the evolving 
conceptions of ‘development’, this approach challenges the belief that refugees are passive.
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apolitical beings and leads us closer to the ideal o f refiigees being active participants in their 
struggle for social and pohtical change.
To explore these ideas in more detail, a  case study examining NGO programming on the 
Thai-Burmese border will be presented. This study will look at the possibihties, challenges and 
outcomes o f participatory development processes in assisting more than 140,000 refugees living 
in ten refugee camps along Thailand’s western border.
B a c k g r o u n d
Perceived as enemies o f the state and threats to national unity, ethnic minority groups 
from Burma' have been consistently marginalized and oppressed by the ruling Burmese military 
regime, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Offensives have been 
launched against these groups for over fifty years in order to minimise their strength and 
opposition to the military government. Policies have included the systematic use of forced 
labour, seizure o f crops and land, forced relocation, torture and extra-judicial killings. As a result, 
thousands of people from Burma have fled into Thailand in search of asylum. As o f February 
2004, approximately 140,000 ethnic minorities as well as Burmese student democracy activists 
reside along the Thai-Burmese border in increasingly overcrowded refugee camps.^
Movement in and out o f the camps is restricted and refugees are prohibited from 
procuring employment. Those caught outside o f the camps may be physically abused, deported 
or detained. This heightened level o f confinement has been accompanied by camp relocations
' Although oflSdaUy renamed ‘Myanmar’ by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1989, ‘Burma’ 
and ‘Burmese’ shall be used throughout tUs paper. Opposition movements, particularly ethnic nationality groups, 
consider the name change illegitimate and continue to use ‘Burma’ as a form of protest against the present military 
regime’s human rights abuses and lack of consultation regarding the name chaise. See Peter Carey, ed. (1997) Burma: 
The Challenge o f  Change in a Divided Society. London: MacMillan.
 ̂ Burmese Border Consortium, (2003) Burmese Border Refiigee Sites with Population Figures -  February 2004 (Map) 
Bangkok: BBC. Although the total population assisted by the BBC is more than 152,000 people, 12,000 Mon have 
already been forced to ‘resettled’ in Mon State after the camps in Thailand were closed shortly after a ceasefire was 
signed between the New Mon State Party and the SPDC in 1996. Because of the continuing human rights abuses bieing 
perpetrated by the SPDC, these resettled Mon are considered internally displaced by most human rights organisations.
closer to the Burmese border, camp closures and an intensified push for repatriation o f all 
Burmese refugees by the current Thai administration/
Non-Burman ethnic refugees have systematically been viewed as having less o f a right to 
membership in the state than the Burman majority. Furthermore, ethnic governments have 
traditionally operated in a top-down, hierarchical manner, typically excluding sub-groups, women 
and youth from access to decision-making. Together these fectors have created a situation 
whereby ethnic minority refugees are perceived as being unable to contribute as citizens to 
change within either their own communities in exile or upon return, within the Burmese polity.
A Review of the Literature 
Refugee: The Object o f  My Rejection
In the decades following World War I, an international refugee regime began to study the
movement of refugees. Scholars assumed the characteristics and actions o f refugees were
predictable and patterned. Furthermore, refugees began to be viewed as objects of knowledge.
As Stein notes, the attitude emerged that
Refugee problems should be analysed from a general, historical, and 
comparative perspective that views them as recurring phenomena with 
identifiable and often identical patterns o f  behaviour and sets o f  
causalities. Specific refugee situations should not be treated as unique, 
atypical, individual historical events but rather as a part o f  a general 
subject.'^
As  objects of knowledge, refugees were often viewed in a manner that was less than humane. 
This manifested itself in the creation of ‘the refugee camp’, first standardised during World War 
n  in Europe. Such camps had multiple purposes. The inhabitants, like those in prisons or 
asylums, were not assumed to be liberal citizens capable o f exercising choice. Well-
 ̂ Interview with a UNHCR official, Mae Hong Son, Thailand. See also: Lang, Hazel (2001) “The repatriation 
predicament of Bnrmese refugees in Thailand: a preliminary analysis” UNHCR Worsting Paper #46: New Issues in 
Rejugee Research Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research.
'* As quoted in Lippert, Randy, “Governing Retirees: The Relevance of Govemmentality to 
Understanding the International Refugee Regime.” Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane 
Governance, Vol. 24: 3: 515.
administered camps “promised to bring [refugees] in line with requirements of such citizenship.”* 
Camp authorities would judge refugee behaviour in terms of conformity or deviation, identifying 
a lucky few to be referred for resettlement. Discipline as well as aid was allocated through the 
camp structures and assistance programmes were typically implemented without refugee 
participation.
Over time, as the majority o f the world’s refugees came from the global South, rather 
than Europe, and with a growing reluctance by western countries to accept large numbers of 
refugees for resettlement, extended care and maintenance became more common. Moreover, the 
longer one remained in a camp, the less potential they were deemed to have as liberal citizens.* 
Rhetoric also arose perpetuating the idea that refugees, as passive recipients of aid, were 
receiving handouts for which they had not worked.^
By imposing solutions aid agencies continuing to use this anti-participatory approach
have rendered refugees powerless and dependent on others for their survival. Furthermore, the
belief that refugees are less competent than humanitarian “experts” coming from afar to run the
camps and assistance programmes persists. As Mark Malloch-Brown notes
Refugee work remains, perhaps, the last bastion of the ultra- 
paternalistic approach to aid and development. It is hard to think of 
another area where the blinkered nonsense of the ‘We know what’s 
best for them’ approach survives so unchallenged.*
Numerous scholars have linked these attitudes to the strict orientation of refugee 
assistance. Falling directly into the traditional relief model, the literature reveals that this type o f 
programming typically excludes its beneficiaries from decision-making and participation is
'  Ibid., p 509.
 ̂Ibid.
’ Sorenson, John, (1994) “An Overview: Refugees and Development”, in H. Adelman and J. Sorenson, (eds.) African 
Refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation, Boulder: Westview Press, p 186.
 ̂ As quoted in Harrell-Bond, (1990) “Breaking the Vicious Circle: Refugees and Other Displaced 
Persons in Africa”, in African Centre for Applied Research and Training in Social Development, ed. The 
African Social Situation: Crucial Factors o f  Development and Transformation, London: Hans Zell, p 
128.
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limited. Barbara Harrell-Bond, among others, has pressed for the rethinking of such policies to 
better reflect the needs of refogees.’
The Traditional Relief Model
Fully established through post-World War II relief efforts, emergency response to 
disaster and displacement typically includes the distribution of aid and provision of essential 
services such as medical care. According to this model, when a crisis occurs, people need 
assistance and outside expertise to overcome it. Donors assess needs and plan strategies of how 
to meet those needs in the most efficient manner possible.’® Programming generally includes 
short-term, life saving measures and some manner o f action taken ‘on behalf o f  those in need. It 
typically includes ‘top-down’ management by organisations undertaking such work." Criticisms 
include the creation of dependency, disempowerment of those affected by crisis and “its 
pathologising, medicalising and labelling assumptions [as well as] the danger of creating tensions 
between those groups who receive assistance and those who do not.” ’̂
Humanitarian (also known as relief) assistance, is the “most apolitical of all acts,” says 
James Orbinski, former head of the medical NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).’̂  According 
to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), “the goal of humanitarianism is not to 
correct wrongs or impose increased justice,” while the High Commissioner for Refugees notes, 
“humanitarian action must remain broadly non-judgemental.”’'* Thus, it is widely acknowledged 
that relief aid is palliative in nature and cannot lead to long-term solutions.'^ Alleviating
’ Harrell-Bond, B. (19B6) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 5.
Mimica, Jadranka and Paul Stubbs, (1996) “Between Relief and Development: Theories, Practice and Evaluation of 
Psycho-social Projects in Croatia.”  Com m unity D evelopm ent Jo u rn a l  V ol. 3 1 :4 : 283.
"  Demusz, Kerry (1998) “From Relief to Development: Negotiating the Continuum on the Thai-Buimese Border” 
Journal o f  Refiigee Studies Vol. 11, No. 3, p 232.
Mimica and Stubbs, op. cit. p 283.
Orbinski, James, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention” Talk given at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, 
Alberta. Broadcasted on CBC Ideas, May 30,2001.
''' Forsythe, David (2001) “UNHCR’s mandate: the politics of being non-political.” Working Paper #33: New Issues in 
R ^ g e e  Research. Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research.
See Hathaway, James (1995) “New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative Role of 
Refugee Protection ”, Journal o f  Refugee Studies Vol. 8:3: 288-294.
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symptoms - hunger, homelessness, and disease - is the bedrock of relief operations and when 
these symptoms are superficially solved, the humanitarian mandate has been achieved.
Though necessary for survival, relief overlooks both root causes and potential solutions 
for refugee populations and refugee hosting governments. For this reason, policy makers and 
scholars began to consider the use of development programming in refugee settings as a 
potentially significant component o f refugee assistance. The objectives and purpose of such 
refugee development has, however, changed dramatically over time.
Spanning the divide: from Refugee Relief to... ?
The idea of incorporating development activities into refugee relief situations has been on 
the agenda for decades. In the late 1970s, recognition that large numbers of refugees were not 
being resettled or repatriated revealed that ‘care and maintenance’’̂  had become the largest part 
o f the UNHCR budget. Many donor states, reluctant to fund these open-ended programmes, 
began to consider alternative models o f assistance. In 1983 Paul Hartling, High Commissioner of 
Refugees, organised a meeting among scholars and practitioners in this field to study “whether or 
how a development approach to refugee situations could remedy this situation and contribute to 
the solution of the problem.””  The international response that emerged during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s became known as the ^refugee aid and developmenf (RAD) strategy. This approach 
encouraged development-oriented assistance from the outset, focusing on refugee-populated areas 
rather than specifically on refugee camps. Refugee self-sufficiency and benefits to the local 
population were anticipated.'* The strategy, however, perceived self-sufficiency through the lens 
of modernisation theory and it was thought that the “best way to make refugees self-sufficient is
The concept of ‘care and maintenance’ has been defined as being completely dependent on international assistance, 
whereby refugees lack even the ability to grow small amounts of food. See Harrell-Bond (1999) “The experience of 
refugees as recipients of aid” in Ager, Alistair (ed.) Refugees: Perspectives on the Experience o f  Forced Migration. 
London: Pinter, p 162.
Cuénod, Jaques. (1989) “Refugees: Development or Relief?” in Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan,eds. Refugees and 
International Relations. Toronto: Oxford University Press, p 232.
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to put them into camps where they can be managed and [aid agencies can] continue to resist the
suggestion that refugees are capable of managing themselves.”’®
Still falling within the RAD strategy, African governments requested, at the Second
International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) in 1984, besides
continued direct assistance to refugees, additional funds to be put towards development projects.
Such projects were to address the increased infrastructure needs of their countries due to the
presence of refugees.^® The focus on development in and fo r  the country of asylum was a key
component o f the RAD approach. Underlying this strategy was the anticipation that host
countries, receiving this additional development assistance for national development
requirements, would more readily acquiesce to refugees settling within their borders, even if  only
temporarily. Cuénod sums up this rationale by explaining
Over 90 per cent of the world's refugees are located in the 
developing countries. Under these circumstances, the least the 
industrialised countries can do is to provide the means to those 
developing countries of asylum to continue to keep their doors 
open.^’
In many ways the refugee aid and development approach appeared to fill m gaps 
identified in the previous relief model. It intended to meet the needs o f both refugee and local 
populations, was meant to be more cost-effective than simple maintenance of long-term refugees 
and was thought to bridge the elusive gap between refugee relief organisations and development 
organisations.^ Projects falling within this framework took place in nineteen African countries 
and cost an estimated US$430 million, yet in most cases failed to meet the predetermined 
objectives. Self-sufficiency among refugees was rarely achieved despite the efforts of various
Crisp, Jeff (2001 ) “Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process.” UNHCR Working 
Paper #43: New Issues in Refugee Research. Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, p 2-3. 
Hyndman (1997), as quoted in Harrell-Bond (1999) p 147.
Cuénod, op.cit. p 230.
Ibid., p 245.
Crisp, op.cit. p 3.
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agencies and the costs of UNHCR care and maintenance did not appear to decrease despite the 
funds put into promoting such activities?^
A criticism of the RAD approach was the ambiguity regarding its objectives. It was 
unclear if  its purpose was to integrate refugees into countries of asylum or to “ameliorate the 
situation of refugees, the host community and state, pending the day when those refugees returned 
to their country of origin?” '̂* Donors, uncomfortable with the idea of linking refugee aid to 
development co-operation, also contributed to the weakness o f the strategy. In addition, 
reluctance on the part of donors and relief and development agencies to work more closely 
limited the possibilities for development. Hence, with the weakness of this approach evident, 
interagency cooperation and an increased synergy between relief and development programming 
was seen as the next step in policy innovation. This was referred to as the continuum between 
relief and development.
A Model ofR elief to Development
In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, there was a shift away fi-om ICARA Il-inspired 
development schemes that focused largely on host country infi-astracture projects. A debate 
emerged which focused on the sequential move from relief to development, known as the relief- 
development continuum. Mechanistic in orientation, this approach was based on the idea that at 
each stage there would be a particular agency to fulfil a specialized task (relief, reconstruction, or 
development) and once that stage was over, the next agency would step in and do its part. 
Emphasizing a linear progression from one stage to another, development and relief were 
perceived as separate activities with no overlap.^^
^  Cuénod, op. cit. p 231.
Barry Stein as quoted in Crisp, op.cit. p 4.
“  Smillie, Ian, (1998) “Relief and Development; The Struggle for Synergy” Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for 
International Studies, Occasional Paper #33, pxxiii.
As development activities were being promoted for returned refugees, in part to 
encourage further such repatriation, a key discussion during this time focused on the 
organisational roles and responsibilities of the UNHCR and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). ''Returnee aid and development' became the focal point for work on this 
continuum. The strategy was "unambiguously intended to promote and consolidate the solution 
o f voluntary repatriation.”^̂  It was also thought that development programming for the newly 
returned would also benefit the country of origin, while donors would appreciate the stabilisation 
of the affected regions which, in turn, would result in fewer refugees requiring international aid.
Although refugee scholars argued that cooperation between the UNHCR and the UNDP 
represented a key solution for refugees, difGculties arose in defining roles between the agencies. 
Loescher argued that the rehabilitation of refugee communities should not be carried out by the 
UNHCR but rather by the UNDP or other UN agencies better equipped to deal with development, 
requiring a full transfer o f responsibility once the immediate emergency relief phase was over. 
The UNDP resisted this idea however, refusing to view itself as even partially emergency 
focused.^’ As noted in a 1997 UNHCR paper titled, "Reintegration in the Transition from  War to
Peace,'
The concept o f the continuum from emergency relief through 
rehabilitation and on to development was intended to ensure a 
seamless web of activities. In practice, however, the 
continuum as applied by UNHCR and its partners often 
resulted in a disjuncture between their respective activities.^*
This type o f continuum thinking, focusing specifically on returnee aid, has neglected the 
needs of refugees who are not yet repatriated and has overlooked the lack o f substantial political 
change in the countries o f  origin to which refugees were returned. The aim o f this strategy, to 
encourage refugee repatriation, has failed to address the initial causes o f displacement and has
^  Crisp, op. cit. p 10.
Loescher, Gil, (1994) “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?” Journal o f  International Affairs 
Vol. 47:2, pp 563-564.
^  As quoted in Smillie (1998) op. cit.. Chapter 1, p 4.
- 9 -
continued to overlook the possibilities of refugees as participants and decision-makers in their 
futures.
The shifting approaches regarding refugee assistance and development have been largely 
influenced by the broader development debates that have been occurring since the 1950s. At this 
juncture, an examination o f the theoretical underpinnings o f the term development and the general 
changes in implementation and policy over the past five decades will be presented. 
Understanding the diverse perspectives on development is a key to unravelling the complexities 
and the possibilities this process holds for refugees.
Defining Development
Pinpointing the exact variables necessary to encourage, create, or even identify 
development is an ongoing challenge for academics and practitioners alike. From The 
Development Dictionary, Sachs notes the Truman inauguration speech o f 1949 as the true 
beginning o f the development era.^  ̂ President Truman asserted that his country should, “embark 
on a bold new program for making the benefits o f our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” °̂
It has been argued that from this moment forward, one of development’s primary goals 
has been for the developed world to assist more than two billion people escape from the 
degradation of underdevelopment. In the policy realm, development was equated explicitly with 
economic growth. In 1955 Arthur Lewis noted that ‘our subject matter is growth, and not 
distribution’, while Rostow’s ^non-communist manifesto'’ o f 1960 presented a linear stages-of- 
growth understanding o f development that epitomised the essence o f modernisation theory. 
Espousing the irreversibility of change from traditional to modem societies and economies.
Sachs, W., ed. ( ] 992) The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power. London: Zed Books, p 2. 
^  As quoted by Gustavo Esteva in Sachs, op. cit. p 6. [italics added]
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stages o f  growth theory was dependent on strong central authorities to disseminate pertinent ideas 
and technology, including the endorsement and encouragement of mass consumption.
These early development strategists, as noted in the UN’s “First Development Decade” 
(1960-70), continued to call for accelerated economic growth, confident that it would percolate, 
or ‘trickle-down’ to the masses in developing countries. Raising per capita income through state- 
led initiatives and shifting national economies firom rural-agricultural to urban-industrial were 
encouraged. This development decade, with its nearly exclusive focus on economic growth, 
ended with the gap between the rich and poor having widened dramatically. ̂
The Second Development Decade (1970-1979), observing the failures o f the previous 
approach, sought to fine-tune the system. An International Development Strategy, approved by 
the UN General Assembly in 1970, held on to the original expectations of the first development 
decade while half-heartedly responding to criticisms relating to the focus on economic growth.^^ 
McNamara, then president o f the World Bank, insisted that the coming decade should see the 
‘dethronement of the GNP’ as the key component of development.^ Social aspects of 
development were to be integrated as ‘redistribution with growth’ and a unified approach to 
development planning was sought. By 1974 the Declaration o f Cocoyoc had articulated the need 
for ‘the development of man’ [sic] as well as processes of growth that lead to the fiilfillment of 
basic human needs. These ideas were expanded by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation which in 
1975 came up with Another Development, empowerment-oriented and focusing on human- 
centred development and self-reliance.^^ Proponents of Another Development (AD) rejected the 
idea that market forces could be impartial arbiters of distribution and placed responsibility in the 
hands of governments and the world community of states to work in the interests o f the poor.^*
Esteva, ibid., p 12.
Seetharam, Mukkavilli (1990) Citizen Participation in Rural Development New Delhi: Mittal Publications, p 5; 
Wolfe, Marshall ( 1998) Elusive Development London: Zed Books, p 48.
^  Esteva, ibid., p 13.
Ibid, p 14-15.
Wolfe, op. cit. p 124.
-  11 -
Acknowledging these ideas, a new mainstream approach appeared in 1976, out o f the 
ILO Conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress. Focusing on the 
social objectives of development, the Basic Needs Approach aimed to achieve certain minimum 
standards of living, including poverty reduction and increased employment.^* Third World 
supporters of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), however, interpreted this sudden 
interest in human welfare as a tactic of the industrialised eountries to ignore the concerns o f the 
Third World in regards to trade restrictions and power structures, inhibiting their ability to put the 
‘big questions’ onto the bargaining table. Basic Needs, continuing to be state-driven and working 
from a welfare perspective to eliminate the most pressing levels o f poverty, also aimed to prevent 
the strengthening of more radical conceptualisations of development.
Critiques that had emerged from the left included the Underdevelopment and Dependency 
schools of thought. According to Baran in The Political Economy o f  Growth (1957), exploitation 
of the Third World was inherent to capitalism and most colonisers were “rapidly determined to 
extract the largest possible gains from the host countries, and to take their loot home.”^̂  Baran 
saw underdevelopment as a direct result of capitalist development in the West. He called it “a 
relationship that no amount o f ‘aid’ or agrarian reform could disguise,” thereby challenging the 
previously uncontested belief that capitalism was a necessary stage in the development o f any 
society.
The Dependency school of thought was another critique o f mainstream economic 
development that emerged out o f Latin America in the mid-1960s. Theorists from this school 
argued that the global economy could not be conceived as a system comprised of equal trading 
partners due to the practice of the centre (industrial societies) imposing conditions o f unequal 
exchange on the periphery (underdeveloped societies) due to the centre’s superior military, 
economic and political power. Unfavourable terms of trade for countries in the periphery led the
Esteva, op. cit., p 15.
^  Seetharam, op. cit. p 6.
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United Nations Economie Commissions for Latin America (ECLA) to embrace indigenous 
industrialisation, a policy commonly referred to as import substitution. Complete with 
protectionist measures against outside markets and high levels of state planning, it was argued 
that import substitution would increase employment levels and lead to more efficient utilisation 
o f local capital.'*’ Though these schools o f thought elucidated the issue of inequality found in the 
development process, particularly in regards to international trade, they maintained the state as a 
key actor.
This changed with the onset of the neo-liberal development agenda in the 1980s. The 
basis for this fi-amework included structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) for developing 
economies, a reduced role for the state (including a reduction in public services) and increased 
trade liberalisation -  both domestically and internationally. State provision of welfare was 
deemed wasteful and inefficient and in many cases was cut back.
The strengthening of the neo-liberal framework coincided with a resurgence o f
development initiatives based on Another Development. Multilateral institutions such as the
UNDP started to create definitions using people-centred conceptions of development, though they
continued to maintain the importance of economic growth. The Human Development Report of
1991, published by the UNDP, notes that
The basic objective of human development is to enlarge the 
range of people’s choices to make development more 
democratic and participatory. These choices should include 
access to income and employment opportunities, education 
and health, and a clean and safe physical environment. Each 
individual should also have the opportunity to participate 
fully in community decisions and to enjoy human, economic 
and political freedoms.'*^
As quoted in Harrison, D. (1988) The Sociology o f  Modernization and Development, London: Unwin Hyman, p 71. 
Ibid., p 71.
Ibid., p 75.
^  Marchak, Patricia. 1991. The Integrated Circus: the New Right and the Restructuring o f Global Markets. Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, p 100.
UNDP, Human Development Report 1991 New York: Oxford University Press, p 1.
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With the increasing acceptance of a more grassroots vision o f development, large 
organisations looked to NGOs, who were more familiar with small-scale and alternative 
development, as the preferred agents to undertake this new agenda. Simultaneously, with the 
increase of NGOs in the field, the era of national development strategies complete with massive 
infinstructure projects, as reflected in the ‘development-as-growth’ strategy was further eroded in 
favour of Another Development. Brian Murphy notes that in the early 1990s, “new NGOs with 
these insights began to emerge, with a focus on the community-based self-help approach that has 
become the common place of NGO literature over the past two decades.”^
NGOs and Another Development
It has been generally accepted that NGOs have an affinity for carrying out activities 
conducive to the ‘Another Development’ (AD) fi-amework. Standing out by their role as social 
catalysts, NGOs are thought to enable individuals to exert more control over the decision-making 
processes that directly touch their lives.'*  ̂ The social involvement o f NGOs has been described as 
having two components, the first being their ability to promote a collective sense o f responsibility 
by making members of a community fully aware of their potential for action. The second is the 
mobilization of social movements by developing structures amenable to grass roots initiatives. 
With respect to governmental authorities, it is argued that NGOs constitute “the germ o f a highly 
vigilant counter-balancing power infused with an activist's vision of politics.” *̂
NGOs, according to some scholars, are characterized institutionally by their aptitude for 
innovation and experimentation, observable in the way they strive to adapt the means of 
production to local resources, capabilities and needs.'*  ̂ It is commonly thought that the NGO
Murphy, Brian K., (1991) “Canadian NGOs and the Politics of Participation” in Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson, 
eds. Conflicts o f Interest: Canada and the Third World. Toronto: Between the Lines, p 169.
Cemea, M. (1988) Nongovernmental Organizations and Local Development. Washington, World Bank Discussion 
Papers, p 3.
^  Rouille d’Orfeuil as quoted in Thérien, Jean-Phillipe. (1991) “Non-govemmental Organizations and International 
Development Assistance” Canadian Journal o f  Development Studies, vol.XlI, No.2. p 272.
Thérien, op.cit. p 272.
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commitment to integrative values, over political and economic values, gives them a natural 
orientation towards the needs of disenfranchised segments of the population that are not met 
through the normal political procedures of government or economic processes of the market/^
A common theme in NGO development literature is the enhancement of capacities while 
simultaneously reducing vulnerabilities/^ Oxfam states that these increased capacities should be 
promoted in order that people can better demand social and economic justice/® Korten 
emphasises that development assistance, unlike relief assistance, should attack the causes of 
global systems failures rather than merely the symptoms implying that development assistance 
should encompass an agenda that questions the structures contributing to disasters and 
displacement.
Duffield, however, argues that most development approaches to displacement have 
resulted in refugees continuing to face the ‘no-solution solution’, which is indefinite care and 
maintenance in the country of first asylum. He notes that the widespread adoption of development 
as a tool for relief settings has fimdamentally altered the interpretation of this concept. As 
Duffield says, “Ideas o f relief and development have become somewhat blurred. Increasingly, 
development has been reduced to welfare and, indeed, relief.”^̂  As an example of the welfare 
role of development, Duffield points to the increasing use of NGOs as subcontractors for UN or 
national development agencies, dealing primarily with the symptoms of global problems. Dubbed 
‘separate development’, it has resulted in “the provision of sustainable welfare safety-nets by 
private agencies,”^̂  effectively severing the ties between development and wider political and
economic issues.
'** K orten, D avid C. (1990) G etting  to the 2 P ‘ C entury: V oluntary A ction  a n d  the G lobal Agenda. W est Hartford: 
Kumarian. p 98.
Anderson, Mary B. and Peter J. Woodrow (1989) Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times o f  
Disaster, Boulder: Westview Press.p 12 
Bade, Deborah and Suzanne Williams, (1995) The Oxfam Handbook o f Relief and Development, Volume 1, Oxford: 
Oxfam, p. 9 
Korten, op. cit. p 204.
Duffield, Mark (1997) “NGO Relief in War Zones; Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm.” Third World 
Quarterly vol. 18 no.3, p 530.
Duffield, op. cit. pp 529-530.
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Zetter too, points out that “...the larger issue remains: that is, the extent to which NGOs, 
whatever their provenance, are really in the business of empowering refugees as opposed to 
providing palliative support which merely enforces refugee dependency on an international 
humanitarian regime.” '̂* Loescher agrees and says that, “the global refugee problem is not a 
humanitarian problem requiring charity but is a political problem requiring political solutions 
and...cannot be separated from...migration, human rights, international security and development 
assistance.”^̂
This attitude emphasises the need for NGO development processes to challenge the 
causes, rather than treat the symptoms, of displacement which is very difficult in a refugee 
setting. The increasing number of organisations defining relief-oriented programming as 
‘developmental’ leads to the challenge of accurate classification. By examining the pragmatic 
goals o f the varying types o f NGOs as well as the processes they use, it is possible to determine 
which organisations fall into the AD framework. Following is a ‘typology of change’ providing 
the criteria necessary to reveal the range of strategies and aims utilised by NGOs and their 
orientation towards social change.
A Typology o f Change
Though the activities of many NGOs remain rooted in the realm of relief assistance, 
others are working towards substantial stractural change. David Korten, in Getting to the 2 T ‘ 
Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, has noted this phenomenon and created a 
typology that explains four generations of NGO strategies, which articulates how the role o f an 
NGO and its definition o f ‘the problem’ will have a profound effect on the course o f action it will
Zetter, Roger (1995) “Enhancing the capacity of local NGOs in Refugee Assistance: Experience from Malawi and 
Zimbabwe” Forced Migration Review, May 1995, (httD://www.frnreview.org/rpn 197.htm. 14 January 2001 ) p 5.
Loescher, Gil, (1994) “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?” Journal o f  International Affairs 
vol. 47 no.2. p# [italics added]
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pursue. This typology provides criteria to evaluate the role of NGO programming in refugee 
settings.
Korten’s first generation strategy focuses primarily on direct service delivery and 
humanitarian or relief assistance, responding to an immediate or visible need. In such cases the 
NGO is perceived as the doer, while the beneficiaries are treated as passive recipients.^* 
Solutions come from the agency rather than the people, and the decisions are typically restricted 
to head offices or relief staff rather than those affected by the process.
Second generation strategies go beyond a relief mandate and are referred to as 
‘developmental’. NGOs pursuing these strategies focus on developing the capacities of the 
people to better meet their own needs through self-reliant local action. These strategies also 
assume a partnership with the community, the latter being expected to contribute to both 
decision-making and implementation of projects and processes. In this case the NGO is viewed 
as a mobiliser of the community. Attempts are also made to change local power structures but 
with the realisation that national and international systems help to maintain local structures. A 
common criticism of this level o f action is that the empowerment-oriented efforts of most NGOs 
are too limited and fi-agmented to impact the larger structures.*^
Strategies from Korten’s third generation seek to change policies and institutions at the 
local, national and global levels. The focus is on creating a policy and mstitutional setting that 
facilitates, rather than constrains, just, sustainable and inclusive local development action. In 
order to create this change it is necessary to work to build the capacity of the people to make 
demands on the system while simultaneously attempting to build alliances with enlightened 
power holders in support of action that makes the system more responsive to the people. In these 
cases, southern NGOs often benefit from money, technical assistance and political pressure
Ibid., p 115. 
Ibid., p 119.
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provided by northern partners and the NGO is viewed as a catalyst of the people rather than a 
service provider.
The final generation strategy looks beyond focused initiatives aimed at changing specific 
policies and institutional sub-systems. The goal, rather, is to energise a critical mass o f 
independent, decentralised initiatives in support of a common social vision. Such a strategy, 
according to Korten, calls for imbuing the public consciousness with an alternative vision 
adequate to mobilise voluntary action on a national or global scale. In this case, the NGO is 
considered a service organisation to the people’s movement it supports. Organisations with this 
orientation are often found working in support of specific causes such as women’s, peace, human 
rights, or environmental movements.^*




















Immediate Project Life Ten to Twenty Years Indefinite Future
Actors NGO NGO plus 
Community
All Relevant Public and 
Private Institutions
Loosely Defined 
Networks of People 
and Organisations
NGO Role Doer Mobiliser Catalyst Activist/Educator
Adapted from Korten, p 117.
This typology, as delineated by Korten, is useful in evaluating the activities o f NGOs and 
interpreting the approaches used to achieve one’s objectives. Elaborating upon these strategies, 
the following model looks specifically at the issue of participation, which is intrinsic to the 
debates on refugee assistance and development.
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NGOs and the Politics o f Participation
Laura Macdonald, in her book Supporting Civil Society presents a typology o f non­
governmental organisations with three ideological approaches; neo-conservative, pluralist and 
post-Marxist/^ Participation is a key component of the model and can be classified according to 
its intended objective. Touted as everything from a radical and empowering alternative to a tool 
used by conventional organisations to achieve more efficient project outcomes, “participation 
means different things to different actors, depending on their position, interest, experience, 
location and ideological orientation.”®® Macdonald presents three approaches to participation: 
instrumental, localised, and political empowerment. Each approach embraces radically different 
aims and objectives, as the following table illustrates:
Typology o f  Non-governmental Organisations: Approaches to Participation










Instrumental Localised Political Empowerment
Role of INGOs Paternalism Laissez-faire Accompaniment
Adapted from Macdonald (1997) p 23.
The neo-conservative (often referred to as neo-liberal) approach often results in NGOs 
being contracted out by the state to administer social services to those hardest hit by harsh 
economic policies. Promoting the neo-liberal policies advocated by the international financial 
institutions, states frequently look to NGOs, with their grassroots development expertise and their 
access to the disadvantaged segments of the population, to implement such programmes. 
Organisations with this orientation advocate the merits of market-led strategies in pursuing
Korten, op. cit. p 123.
Macdonald, Laura. (1997) Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role o f  Non-Covemmental Organizations in 
Central America. London: MacMillan, p 15.
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development and see their role as assuaging the worst suffering caused by economic structural
adjustment, in order to ensure social stability. Individualistic solutions to assorted crises are
favoured. Amelia Cohn notes that
neo-liberal ideologues throw their weight against organised 
pressure groups, rich or poor, to selectively assist the poor as 
individuals. Their economic proposals “deorganize” society, 
while shrinking the state to a minimal, clientistic, social welfare 
role.^’
NGOs that take on this service-oriented approach often foster the neo-liberal idea of 
“private responsibility for social problems and the importance of private resources to solve these 
problems.”^̂  This approach also fits into a social welfare fi-amework, whereby the poor are 
effectively disorganised and depoliticised. Within such fi-ameworks participation is used as an 
instrument to meet predetermined objectives. It is thought that the inclusion o f local people 
(often limited to providing cheap or voluntary labour) will lead to the improvement of 
development projects. Used to increase program cost effectiveness and efficiency, such a 
strategy can be seen as manipulative and status quo oriented.^^ Primarily concerned with 
economic growth and deeply rooted in the modernisation paradigm, institutions such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank encourage the use of instrumental participation in their 
existing development programming. Predictably, agendas are determined, objectives defined and 
solutions envisaged long before local people have the opportunity to become involved. 
Furthermore, the ‘beneficiary’ community remains “disarticulated and dependent on foreign 
funding and decision-making.”^
Poirier, Colette (1996) Empowering Women in Rural Northern Nigeria: Towards a Framework fo r  Feminist 
Participatory Development Practice. Halifax; Saint Maiy’s University, p. B47.
Cohn, Amelia. (1995) “NGOs, Social Movements, and the Privatization of Health Care: Experiences in Sao Paulo.” 
in Reilly, Charles A., ed. New Paths to Democratic Development in Latin America: The Rise o f  NGO-Municipal 
Collaboration. Boulder, Lynne Reinner. p 95.
“  Petras, James. (1997) “Imperialism and NGOs” AfontWy Review vol. 49, p 14.
Macdonald, op. cit., p 32.
^  Ibid., p 10.
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A middle ground can be found in what Macdonald terms localised participation. 
Associated with the liberal-pluralist view, NGOs within this framework take the place normally 
assigned to interest groups. Acting as intermediaries between the masses and the state, such 
groups try to organise those at the grassroots to stand up for their rights and to be included in 
society through increased participation.^^ Situated within Korten’s ‘Second Generation strategy’ 
localised participation attempts to increase the abilities of participants to run their own affairs and 
should involve a degree o f authentic control by local organisations. It is difficult to determine, 
however, how changes at the local level will affect larger institutions and structures.
This leads to the post-Marxist approach to participation, which Macdonald sees as 
encouraging political empowerment. Presenting a critical view of power relations within society, 
NGOs in this case typically choose the side of the poor, recognising that discrirnination and 
oppression can occur in all locations.^^ Orlando Fals-Borda and Anisur Rahman among others 
define such participation as empowering and argue that it must encourage people to be active 
participants in all aspects o f the processes intended to improve their lives and transform the 
contexts and conditions within which they live.
This participation-as-empowerment approach, combined with third and fourth generation 
NGO strategies, results in the type o f participatory development required to encourage social 
change. Yet the possibility for refugees to direct processes for change remains highly limited 
with the continuing implementation o f outside directed assistance programming. It can be argued 
that the ubiquitous top-down relief model and the resultant passivity reflects the assumption that 
refugees cannot (or should not) strive to realise their capacity to act as citizens while displaced 
from their country of origin. By looking more closely at the concept o f citizenship, it becomes 





Emerging Citizenship through Participatory Development
Citizenship...means the contribution of our instructed judgement 
to the common good. It may lead us to support the state; but it 
may lead us also to oppose it.
Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics.
An aspect of development assistance that rarely emerges, despite its importance, is the 
fundamental link between refugees and citizenship. As noted earlier, camp inhabitants were not 
traditionally assumed to be ‘liberal citizens’ capable of exercising choice. Encouraging refugee 
conformity, aid workers and external authorities would identify those considered worthy offuture 
citizenship rights upon resettlement in a third country. Promoting citizenship within the camps 
was neither considered feasible nor a feasible aspect of assistance programming, particularly in 
regards to the necessity o f neutrality by numerous aid organisations.
It is generally assumed that the right to citizenship is terminated once a person is labelled 
“refugee” . The right to citizenship, however, is assured in international conventions such as those 
on the legal status of refugees. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also 
“postulates everybody’s right to a citizenship and that nobody shall be deprived arbitrarily o f his 
or her nationality.”^  A citizen is considered the opposite of a subject, i.e. having basic rights in 
relationship with the state. As a refugee the ability to claim citizenship rights is highly limited.^’
Also pressing, however, is the ability to regain, or learn anew, the process o f ‘acting as 
citizen’ to create and work towards change even during displacement. Laski refers to this as 
contributing one’s “instructed judgement towards the common good.”™ Acting as citizen is 
having the ability and the confidence to contemplate the future of one’s community, to organize, 
to oppose oppression and to participate in decision-making processes.
Cleaver, Frances. (1999) “Paradoxes of Participation: Questioning Participatory Approaches to Development.” 
Journal o f  International Development vol. 11, p 599.
Baubock, Rainer (1994) Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration, Brookfield, 
Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing p 28.
Ibid., p 27.
™ Laski, Harold (1963)^ Grammer o f  Politics, London: Allen and Unwin.
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NGOs must see refugees capable as citizens (or future citizens) o f working towards social 
change despite their typically long-term displacement. The continuing acceptance o f the 
traditional relief model, with its encouragement o f passivity and dependence among refugees, has 
obscured many NGOs from viewing refugees as fully capable of creating social change.
NGOs incorporating participatory development approaches in their work with refugees as 
based on criteria identified in the Korten/Macdonald model are, by the very nature o f their 
mandate, utilising processes that encourage internally derived solutions to problems, while 
simultaneously addressing wider structural issues. Refugees should be, able to reflect on their 
situation and work towards solutions as citizens despite their current displacement.
Incorporating this issue of citizenship into NGO work is a twofold process involving 
content of programming as well as the processes used and promoted by the organisations. NGOs 
incorporating these aspects of programming and process into their work are transforming what it 
means to be a refugee; that is, recognising that one’s capacity to act as citizen despite 
displacement. This thesis, therefore, aims to illustrate that those NGOs most successful in 
implementing participatory development frameworks in the camps are those that consistently 
address this issue of social action among refugees through the content and processes o f  their 
work.
NGOs acknowledging the ability of refugees to act as citizens will be those that attempt 
through their programming to energize a critical mass o f independent, decentralised initiatives in 
support of a common social vision and to influence policies and institutions at local, regional and 
global levels. Encouraging participation as political empowerment in programming undertaken in 
the camps as well as presenting a critical view of power relations, including the role o f NGOs, 
within the refugee communities are processes that need to be incorporated into these activities.
To determine if  the above criteria are present in the work o f NGOs, a framework has 
been identified. This framework, combining aspects from Korten’s and McDonald’s work, 
consists of programming/process that;
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1) Facilitates just, sustainable and inclusive development action in order to change 
policies and institutions at all levels (Korten’s 3̂*̂ Generation Strategy).
2) Energises a critical mass o f independent, decentralised (refugee-led) initiatives in 
support of a common social vision (Korten's 4* Generation Strategy).
3) Utilises participation that encourages people to be active participants in all aspects 
o f the processes intended to improve their lives and transform the contexts and 
conditions within which they live (McDonald’s Participation as Political 
Empowerment).
In a camp setting, capacity building initiatives are activities with the potential to encourage 
refugee-led social change through the formation o f refugee-run organisations that have the ability 
to work towards social change. In addition, NGO solidarity efforts that encourage linkages 
between those in the camps with other groups/communities leading to the sharing o f ideas, 
research, solutions and experiences is another aspect of participatory development that 
strengthens a common social vision.
NGOs encouraging the inclusion o f citizenship in their work will undertake processes 
whereby; refugees are viewed as partners and take part in the decision-making processes; a broad 
range o f refugees are engaged and participate in NGO programming and policy formation; NGOs 
maintain roles in which they are considered catalysts, activists/educators or ‘hands-off donors, 
and finally resist hierarchical/elitist practices in hiring, training, and utilisation of refugee staff or 
volunteers.
Methodology
This study is based on research completed in Karen and Karenni refugee camps on the 
Thai-Burmese border from May to September 2000. This five-month field research process 
began in Bangkok and led to the jungles and mountain ranges of the Thai-Burmese border. Due 
to the difficulties associated with entering the refugee camps, it was unclear at the outset to which
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locations I would have extended access. It was thus to my delight that my first interview 
respondent, an elderly refugee woman in Bangkok, decided my questions would be more easily 
answered if I accompanied her back to her camp on the border.^’ I quickly agreed. This process 
led me northward and upon arrival into the Karen refugee camp, I met the camp leaders, the 
school headmaster and many members of indigenous refugee organisations. Most rewarding 
however, was living with a refugee family, consisting of four children, their mother and 
grandmother and learning firsthand the struggles and triumphs they faced each day. Standing in 
line for rations, sleeping in a bamboo hut, walking fi’om one section of the camp to another with a 
baby on my back, a bag of vegetables in one hand and a live chicken in the other are events I will 
always remember. Having the eldest daughter apply thanaka (traditional sandalwood paste) to 
my face each morning while the youngest sat on my knee and sang sweet folk songs, embedded 
into my memory the generosity and grace of those I had the good fortune to meet.
Upon departing this camp I continued northward up the border and was able to visit a 
number of other refugee camps including one Karenni camp for an extended length o f time. 
Volunteering as an English teacher in the camp and assisting other refugee organisations with 
proposal writing and editing, I was able to get an in-depth understanding o f the intricacies 
involved in promoting social change in such an uncertain setting. I also came face to face with 
issues relating to refugee security, NGO access to the camps, and the political intrigue of living a 
precarious existence as a refugee on a border where repatriation could occur at any time. This 
camp became the primary site for the study although activities and programming from other areas 
along the border have also contributed to the data collected and analysed in this thesis.
Using qualitative inquiry to achieve the research objectives, the data collected for this 
study includes the history and the current state o f NGO programming and activities on the Thai- 
Burmese border, looking particularly at the philosophies and mandates o f the various
Although most refugees cannot travel outside the camps without fear of deportation, some refugees have been able to 
procure identity documents which then allow them to travel freely throughout the country.
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organisations; the participatory development processes used by NGOs including their objectives 
in using them; refugee leadership and decision-making structures in the camps and their level of 
collaboration with international NGOs; the opinions and experiences of refugees regarding the 
NGO presence in the camps; and the mandate, policies and activities of the UNHCR in regard to 
displaced Burmese in Thailand.
Data for this study were collected through open-ended and key informant interviews with 
NGO and UNHCR staff, refugees from a wide variety of backgrounds and donors, 
(approximately seventy interviews were completed during the course of the research); 
participation in NGO reliefrdevelopment activities including meetings, workshops and 
brainstorming sessions (eleven meetings with various refugee groups/NGOs were attended and 
sixteen NGO projects were visited); participant observation in three refugee camps (two Karen 
and one Karenni) on the Thai-Burmese border; and a comprehensive review o f secondary sources 
including published research papers, NGO surveys and human rights reports.
Limitations and Sensitivity o f  the Study
It is necessary to note that data gathered from the field was frequently provided by key 
informants who were English speakers and from particular religious and ethnic backgrounds. 
They generally had higher educational backgrounds with more access to international NGO 
workers and programming than non-English-speaking and less educated individuals in the eamps. 
Translators from within the refugee communities typically fit into these categories as well. 
Though satisfied that the data collected is able to answer the questions posed in this study, there 
are myriad realities and power relations in the camps and it is beyond the ability of this study to 
fully address them all.^^
For a greater understanding of intra-community dynamics and diversity in Karenni refugee camps, see Dudley, 
Sandra (1999) “‘Traditional’ culture and refugee welfare in north-west Thailand” Forced Migration Review December 
5-8.
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In addition, conducting research in a country where the government does not approve, 
where the Burmese regime may use the information to pressure the Thailand to stop allowing 
‘excessive’ support for the refugees, and where armed groups attack or infiltrate refugee 
communities, (spies are regularly found in the camps), the sensitive nature of this research carmot 
be overemphasised. All interviews have been coded to ensure confidentiality for refugee and 
NGO respondents. NGOs are only named if  they have official permission by the Thai authorities 
to implement their programming and/or are so well known that the information provided here can 
be easily acquired from other sources.
The first chapter of this thesis introduces the study, provided an overview of the literature 
and explained the methodology. Chapter Two explores the role and mandate of the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees looking at the impacts of its policies and practices and its 
understanding and implementation of the development process in refugee settings. The UNHCR’s 
arrival on the Thai-Burmese border is presented and concludes with an analysis o f the protection 
and assistance to Burmese refugees in Thailand. Chapter Three presents the political and 
historical background of Burma’s struggle for independence, the emergence and failure o f a post­
independence democratic state and the ensuing and continuing struggles o f the ethnic minority 
groups for their rights as citizens within the polity. Chapter Four examines NGO programming 
and processes and its impact on refugees in the camps. Chapter Five provides Conclusions and 
Recommendations.
- 2 7 -
CHAPTER TWO
T h e  UNHCR: P r o t e c t i n g  W hom ?
As the prime multilateral institution dealing with refugee protection, the mandate, 
policies and programming o f the United Nations High Commission for Refugees affects the 
possibilities for refugees as social change actors under the organisation’s mandate as well as the 
effectiveness and possibilities of non-govemmental assistance efforts. An examination of 
UNHCR protection and assistance efforts, particularly development assistance, will be presented. 
Following this, an examination of the organisation’s move towards relief assistance as a form of 
protection, and development programming as an instrument of repatriation will take place. This 
second half of this chapter will present an overview o f the UNHCR’s arrival on the Thai-Burmese 
border and conclude with an analysis of its protection and assistance o f Burmese refugees in 
Thailand.
Role and Mandate
In 1951 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees was set up by the United 
Nations Security Council with a mandate to provide international protection to refugees and to 
seek permanent solutions to the problem of refugees.^^ This went hand in hand with the 
simultaneously created Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees, a legally binding treaty and 
a cornerstone of international refugee law. The Convention defines refugees as ‘Persons who are 
outside their country because o f a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership o f a particular social group or political opinion.’ The Convention, which 
introduced the principle o f non-refoulement, (making forced repatriation illegal if  one’s life or 
freedom were at risk), laid down minimum standards for the treatment of European refugees who
Inter-Agency Standing Committee Secretariat (2000) Humanitarian Action in the 2ti‘ Century, New York: OCHA, p 
26.
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were forced to flee their homes before 1951. A later protocol abolished the 1951 deadline and 
made the Convention universally applicable to all refugees in 1967.^'’
As of November 2000, 133 states had ratified both the Convention and Protocol with 140 
states party to either one or both of these instruments.’  ̂ The UNHCR, however, lacks the 
authority to enforce the Convention or implement programming unilaterally. As Harrell-Bond 
notes, “Vis-à-vis governments that host refugees, UNHCR can only provide its services with 
permission, and such permission may not be forthcoming, particularly in cases where states are 
not parties to the conventions.”’  ̂ States that have not signed the Convention (including Thailand 
and Burma) are not bound by the same conditions regarding their treatment of refugees.
Protection
Given the need for government endorsement prior to implementation o f programming, 
the UNHCR has traditionally worked to implement its protection mandate by lobbying 
governments to sign international conventions relating to refugees. They also monitor the actions 
of states that have signed the refugee convention. Within states, protection activities include 
working with individual governments on admissions procedures, interviewing asylum seekers, 
determining refugee status and issuing identity documents. Activities do not, however, 
encompass the physical protection of refugees. UNHCR staff members are rarely in the camps 
and, as noted by the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, “it is clear 
that neither the UNHCR nor indeed any other humanitarian agency is adequately equipped to 
protect the physical integrity of people.” ”
In reality, humanitarian NGOs are often left to the role of using their presence as a type 
of protection in the camps which they are not qualified or officially allowed to do. The UNHCR
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues ( 1986) Refugees: Dynamics o f  Displacement. 
London: Zed Books, p 20.
UNHCR, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 f ro m  UNHCR REFWORLD. 
(http:www.unhcr.ch/refworld/refworld/Iegal/instrume/asyIum/51engsp.htm, 23 April, 2001)
Harrell-Bond, B. (1990) op. cit., p 116.
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needs to recognise the gap in protection for refugees and work to ensure physical protection of 
refugees, perhaps by placing this role on a host government body that they can then shame or 
cajole into protecting those under their stewardship. Unfortunately, refugees are more often seen 
as a threat to the host country rather that a group of people requiring protection fi’om persecution.
Solutions
The second aspect of the UNHCR mandate is to “seek permanent solutions to the 
problem of refugees”. Official solutions to refugee crises have long been limited to three options: 
voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum or third country 
resettlement. The UNHCR considers the first option, repatriation, to be the most favourable. It is 
also considerably easier to for the UNHCR to repatriate than to persuade a third country, usually 
industrialised and developed, to accept increasing numbers of refugees. Countries of first asylum, 
located primarily in the south, are also becoming increasingly intolerant of hosting the refugees 
that reach their borders. Repatriation, therefore, remains the most preferred ‘solution’ and the 
official repatriation policy o f the UNHCR has changed dramatically over the past few decades in 
order to reflect these circumstances.
Initially, refugees could not be repatriated unless the situation from which they had fled 
had visibly improved and there was no perceived threat to their well being upon return. From the 
1980s, however, new categories were created which enabled repatriation to take place under less 
than ideal conditions. According to one UNHCR official, the organisation has moved away from 
the original principles guiding repatriation because states are increasingly demanding refugees 
return as quickly as possible and, furthermore, it is nearly impossible to objectively determine the 
level o f safety in many ‘post-conflict’ settings. Thus, it appears that the concept o f non­
refoulement has been gradually debased. A UNHCR staff member, asked about the possibility of 
encouraging forced repatriation revealed, “We would never push Refugees across a border at
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, (1986) op. cit. p 52.
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gunpoint.” *̂ Other measures carried out by countries of asylum, however, such as reductions in 
food aid, relocation of camps, and harassment by security forces are all inducements for refugees 
to return before the situation has improved.
With no jurisdiction over the local authorities and being based outside of the camps, the 
UNHCR is unable to physically protect refugees in situations of forced repatriation. It can be 
argued, therefore, that the facilitative role of the UNHCR in repatriation is not so much a solution 
to the refugee crisis, as evidence of their inability to act without the permission o f host country 
governments or support from northern donors. Furthermore, with the organisation’s budget 
being stretched further each year, repatriation is the most cost-effective way to deal with refugees 
as once they are back in their country of origin the repatriated are technically no longer under the 
jurisdiction o f the UNHCR.
Third country resettlement is another so-called durable solution and depends on the 
willingness and cooperation of foreign governments in order to be implemented. As the UNHCR 
Resettlement Handbook notes,
No country is legally obliged to resettle refugees. Only a small 
number of States do so on a regular basis.... Accepting refugees 
for resettlement is a mark o f true generosity on the part of 
Governments.^^
Looking at the effectiveness of this option, less than one percent o f the world’s refugees 
were resettled in third countries in 1993.*° The end of the cold war marked a decrease in the 
perceived political-strategic interest in refugees whose presence up until that point had been 
deemed substantive (and much needed) proof o f the failure of the communist system.*^ The 
increasing reluctance of states to accept refiigees in the post-cold war era has coincided with a
Barnett, Michael (2001) “UNHCR and the Politics o f ’Repz&naüoïT Forced Migration Review, Issue 10, p 31.
^  UNHCR, (1997) The Resettlement Handbook. Geneva: UNHCR Documentation Unit. 
thttp://www.unhcr.ch/resettle/handbook/1 .htm.. 14 May 2001)
Loescher, Gil and Ann Dull Loescher (1994) The Global Refugee Crisis. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. p 14.
Roberts, Adam (1998) “More Refugees, less Asylum: A Regime in Transformation” Journal of Refugee Studies Vol.
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willingness o f both governments and multilateral institutions to finance humanitarian assistance 
in or near the country o f origin.
This leads to the last of the traditional solutions, which is settlement in the country of first 
asylum. As with third country resettlement, local integration is contingent upon approval of the 
host government, which may not be forthcoming in situations of mass influx, given the likelihood 
of scarce resources as well as religious and ethnic tensions. Although the majority of the world’s 
refugees are in the developing world, countries of asylum do not regularly grant them the right to 
local integration but more often limit their generosity to temporary asylum in closed refugee 
camps.
It is evident, therefore, that these traditional solutions often fail to ensure the safety of 
refugees or the resolution of the situation leading to their displacement. As Erika Feller, director 
of UNHCR’s Department o f International Protection notes, “The Convention [Relating to the 
Status o f Refugees] is no panacea for all the problems of displacement. Root causes are outside 
its scope.”®̂ Many would agree that this statement applies equally to the mandate of the 
UNHCR.
UNHCR Programming
Returning to the question regarding the impacts of UNHCR programming on refugees, 
does the UNHCR work to ensure the protection of refugees in the hopes that they may act as 
citizens capable of choice and action during their displacement? On the flip side, is the absence 
of UNHCR dialogue and debate with their refugee constituents regarding protection issues a 
reflection o f the organisation’s belief that refugees are incapable of choice and action due to their 
displacement?
ll,N o .4 ,p 3 7 8 .
Feller, Erika (2001 ) “The Convention at 50: the way ahead for refugee protection.” in Forced Migration Review, 
Issue 10, p 6.
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Shifting away from the root causes of displacement, the UNHCR, through the 1990s, has 
spent more time and resources on massive relief operations. This move into humanitarian 
assistance by UNHCR officials has been defended as a new form o f protection. The 1999 
UNHCR Global Report states that “identifying vulnerable groups and prioritising assistance to 
ensure their physical security, access to food, safe accommodation, and primary education” are aU 
components of “the daily practice of protection.”*̂  Critics o f this policy point out that the shift in 
focus from legal protection to emergency assistance in recent years has “spawned a new cadre of 
logistics personnel and managers whose priorities are effectiveness o f aid delivery rather than 
protection.”*̂  Emergencies in these cases are perceived “in terms of logistics and not as failures 
o f politics, the development process or ethnic relations.”*̂
Capacity Building as Protection
A feature of the UNHCR’s humanitarian assistance programming that has emerged with 
the shift away from traditional protection strategies has been capacity building. According to the 
organisation, capacity building: “focuses on existing initiatives, commitments and potential as 
distinct from relief, which addresses needs and problems. It aims to build a network o f partners 
at various levels, is highly participatory by nature and requires shared commitments and 
objectives on the part of external and domestic actors.” As a set of activities, capacity building: 
“implies provision of technical support, including training, advisory services and specialised 
expertise in favour of national/local institutions or structures, aimed at fulfilling the UNHCR’s 
primary objectives of protection and solutions.”**
UNHCR involvement in capacity building initiatives in countries of asylum has been 
identified as fostering state responsibility for the management of asylum systems in line with
Feller, p 4.
Loescher, Gil, (2001) “UNHCR and the Erosion of Refugee Protection” in Forced Migration Review, Issue 10, p 28. 
Ibid., p 29.
^  Furley, Kemlin and Jenifer Otsea (1999) A Practical Guide to Capacity Building as a Feature o f UNHCR's 
Humanitarian Programmes. Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, p 3.
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international standards and practices. Once this is accomplished, “UNHCR sets out to strengthen 
the capacity o f those institutions tasked with its implementation.”*’ Activities closer to the 
people are also identified in the capacity building fi'amework and focus on promoting 
reconciliation between communities and strengthening national protection, particularly at the 
local level. These activities are viewed as a means of preventing repeat instances of 
displacement.**
Assistance targeting returned refugees is also becoming more common. Veering away 
from the traditional protection mandate, another assistance initiative of the organisation is known 
as the ‘Quick Impact Project’ (QIP), first used in Nicaragua and extended to Afghanistan, 
Cambodia and Somalia. Used to stabilise recently returned refugee communities (in order to 
ensure they do not return to the country of asylum), QIPs are small-scale development projects 
aimed at alleviating extreme poverty and intended to lead to the quick rehabilitation of 
communities.*^
This recent focus on refugee return through capacity building and limited development 
assistance exposes the shift of UNHCR operational priorities from countries o f asylum to 
countries o f origin. In addition, this shift may actually strengthen the ability of host countries to 
return refugees prematurely, long before the politics and security situation in the country of origin 
are able to ensure the safety of the refugees. From a broader policy perspective, these activities 
could be deemed detrimental to refugee populations, as the solutions to their displacement are 
reduced to issues o f relief and limited development assistance while the root causes of the conflict 
leading to their displacement remain.
Indeed, increased incidents o f refoulement not only result in refugees being forced back 
across borders against their will, but reflect the ultimate denial of human rights. In such cases, 




repatriation is a looming possibility, an examination of the UNHCR’s presence and policies 
towards refugees from Burma is necessary. The following section will examine the UNHCR 
history o f programming and presence in the region.
The UNHCR Presence in Thailand
Although there has been cross border flight from Burma into Thailand since the military 
coup d ’état of 1962, and particularly since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the UNHCR was 
only recently granted a mandate on the Thai-Burmese border. Reluctance on the part o f the Thai 
government to allow UNHCR a presence on this border stems from Thailand’s previous 
experiences with the UNHCR and the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) during 
the Indochinese refugee crisis. Highly internationalised, drawn out, and resulting in Thailand 
having the single largest refugee burden of any of the ASEAN states (1.3 million refugees have 
found refuge in Thailand since 1975), the UNHCR has traditionally been viewed as slow and 
bureaucratic by the Thai government.^
Consistent in its denial o f granting refugee status, Thailand insists that those from Burma 
(as the Cambodians before them) are not refugees but “displaced persons”. Choosing not to sign 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees, Thailand is not obligated to have the 
UNHCR work within its borders. Nonetheless, in 1998 after persistent urging from refugee 
leaders and NGO lobbying efforts®’, the UNHCR was finally granted permission by the Royal 
Thai Government (RTG) to have a presence on the Burmese border. By 1999 the UNHCR had 
set up three offices in Thailand based in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot and Kanchanaburi provinces.®^
Loescher, Gil, ( 1994) “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?” Journal o f International Affairs 
Vol. 47: 2, p 63-64.
^  Nakavachara, Netnapis and John Rogge, (1987) “Thailand’s Refugee Experience”, in John Rogge, ed. Rejugees: A 
Third World Dilemma. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, p 271.
Lobbying efforts by the Burmese Border Consortium led to High Commissioner Ogata authorising the first UNHCR 
visit to the border in 1992. From this visit by UNHCR staff in Bangkok the Karen were first deemed (by the UNHCR, 
not Thailand) to be genuine refugees. See Burma Ethnic Research Group and Freidrich Naumann Foundation (1998) 
Forgotten Victims o f  a Hidden War: Internally Displaced Karen in Burma. Chiang Mai: Nopburi Press, p 53.
UNHCR, (January 2000) UNHCR Activities at the Thai/Myanmar Border (Briefing Note), Bangkok: UNHCR.
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Given that the assistance programming in these areas was already being provided by 
NGOs active on the border since the beginning o f the refugee influx, the focus for the UNHCR in 
Thailand has remained focused on setting up clear admissions procedures/^ The UNHCR has 
also provided funding for ‘protection-related’ activities that fall outside current NGO mandates 
such as improving access roads into camps and environmental training activities/'* As a UNHCR 
official explains
...assistance is also leverage for the protection... .because if  you 
don’t start any activities in the camps you don’t have any contact 
with the refugees... You don’t have any leverage vis-à-vis the 
[Thai] authorities. We support also a little bit the authorities on 
the local level.... because you know, protection is a lot of 
talking.^^
Other activities undertaken by the agency include advocating for the expansion of the 
camps (as many are overcrowded) and providing training and promotional activities to various 
segments o f the population (media, NGOs, refugees and Thai authorities) to disseminate 
information about the UNHCR’s role and mandate in the refugee eamps. Providing information 
directly to the refugees has been slow to occur, as the Thai government does not encourage a 
UNHCR presence in the camps. As an official at UNHCR head office in Bangkok explained
In this situation on the Thai-Myanmar [Burma] border, we are 
not allowed to have offices in the camp. So we have to travel 
and it’s quite far. When you arrive in the camps, you don’t have 
any place to sit down except the [Thai] MOI office. You know, 
sometime it can be embarrassmg to have the refugees come to 
the MOI office and talk with UNHCR. So we are like a visitor, 
in fact, in the camps.^®
Despite these difficulties, one UNHCR protection officer on the border has initiated 
meetings with refugee groups in order to discuss the laws regarding forced repatriation and the
Interview 2M with UNHCR Official in Bangkok, Thailand.
UNHCR, (June 2000) UNHCR-fiinded Activities on the Thai-Myanmar Border/UNHCR Activities/Budgets in 
Maneeloy Students Centre, Bangkok: UNHCR.
^  Interview 2M, with UNHCR official in Thailand.
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role o f the UNHCR. Believing that more refugees would be willing to cooperate with the 
organisation if its role were more clearly understood, the initiative is unique along the border. 
The reality remains that many of the policies are beyond the control o f the UNHCR and they are 
able to only implement policies outlined by the Thai government.
Also difficult is the widespread fear among refugees that the UNHCR is on the border to 
help with future repatriation efforts. As a member a refugee women’s organisation explained, 
once a UNHCR office is established in Burma that has access to the border (ethnic minority)
areas, it is thought that repatriation efforts will be allowed to commence.^’ Due to this belief,
many refugees are reluctant to register with the organisation fearing that in the event o f an 
involuntary repatriation they would be targeted by the Burmese authorities upon their return.
UNHCR officials maintain that the requirements of voluntary repatriation first need to be
met despite Thailand’s insistence on imminent repatriation
[Thai] Authorities are talking about the three-year plan [for
repatriation of all refugees], but they never say what the starting
date is for these three years.... the situation evolves all the time, 
so we cannot plan like that to return the people. We try to 
increase our relationship with UNHCR Myanmar. We have 
regular contact with them, and we try to have access on the other 
side because we cannot repatriate unless we have access and can 
monitor their return.^*
On March 11, 2004 the UNHCR was granted permission by the Burmese government to 
visit the border regions inside Burma, namely Mon and Karen States and Tenasserim Division. 
Their objective is to hold workshops in order to assess the situation regarding health, education, 
community services, infrastructure development and landmines. An official from Bangkok 
explains that “There are some minimum conditions that need to be met before people are offered 
the opportunity to go home.”®’ The fear of current refugees is that the camps will be closed
' Ibid.96
Personal communication with a staff member from a refugee women’s organisation (22H), on file with author.
^  Interview 2M, on file with author.
^  Macan-Markar, Marwaan, “Burma: UN says refugees’ return won’t be easy or quick” IPS News, 17 March, 2004. p 
1 .
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before conditions in Burma improve and those that refuse to leave Thailand will be treated as 
illegal migrants, subject to detention and forced deportation. UNHCR assistance in these 
repatriation efforts, despite the continuing oppression o f the military regime, has created an 
impression among the Thai public that the refugees’ right to claim asylum in their country is over.
The NGO Perspective on Refugee Protection
With the absence of a protection-mandated organisation such as the UNHCR on the
border, NGOs often found themselves in difficult situations, observing human rights abuses,
attacks on camps and the forcible return o f refugees. Without an official forum in which to air
these protection-related issues there was very little action that could be taken. NGOs working
without a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Thai government were particularly
incapable of action as their programming could be threatened if  they were publicly critical of
Thai policies. The arrival of the UNHCR in 1999 raised hopes among NGOs that the issue of
protection would now be officially handled by an agency capable of such a role. Though NGOs
were able to achieve program objectives in the camps.
Once protection was an issue, it became clear that while NGOs 
could monitor the situation and foster international interest in the 
refugees and understanding o f the problems,... they could not 
alone provide the protection which UN agencies are mandated to 
do.'°°
NGOs with programs on the Thai-Burma border saw UNHCR’s arrival onto the scene as 
long overdue. Now that the UNHCR has been on the border for a few years, the ‘honeymoon’ 
period is over and it is felt by many NGOs and refugee groups that the UNHCR is failing to take 
a lead in protection issues along the border. As one NGO director noted, “The UNHCR has no 
proactive role in the camps.”’®' Activities are largely limited to high-level meetings with policy 
makers, though admissions boards have been established in three provinces. But as an UNHCR
’ Burma Ethnic Research Group (1998) op. cit., p 58.
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official notes, “the admission boards are more or less in place and we should be observers, but so 
far the government didn’t invite us to attend this admission board.”' D e s p i t e  the limited role 
that Thai government has allowed the UNHCR, an NGO worker on the border explains “w e’re 
going to keep pushing UNHCR to keep trying to make sure refugees have proper protection.”'
NGOs have requested protection training to learn about the procedures in place, when 
and if they should contact the UNHCR and how they can ensure better coordination with the 
agency. As one NGO director explained, “we want to engage [the UNHCR] at the Thailand level 
to see what could be done better.”"'  ̂ Training sessions by UNHCR staff presenting examples 
drawn fi’om their operations and successes in Afiica failed, however, to provide relevant 
information about the policies and circumstances of protection issued m Thailand. Officials 
interviewed in the UNHCR Bangkok office had neither been to the border areas, nor were they 
aware of the day-to-day realities o f life in a Thai refugee camp.
In conclusion, the UNHCR plays a necessary and challenging role negotiatmg with host 
governments as well as refugee-producing governments in order to fulfill their mandate to 
provide international protection to refugees and to seek permanent solutions to the problems o f 
refugees. Particularly in the case o f the Thai-Burma border, the UNHCR relies heavily on NGOs 
to coordinate and provide humanitarian assistance. The NGO presence is also the primaiy way in 
which widespread awareness o f protection issues emerges from the isolated camp locations. The 
UNHCR does not engage directly with their refugee constituents, neither during policy formation 
nor in the planning o f their activities. UNHCR activities that take place during displacement 
rarely encourage decision-making or participation by refugees on the ground.
The UNHCR, given its role dealing bilaterally with governments is operating from a 
perspective whereby government actions and policies are prioritised in working to resolve the
Interview 26GA with NGO director, on file with author.
Interview 2M, on file with author.
Interview 3M, on file with author.
Interview 8HFN, on file with author.
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issue o f displacement. However, in the case o f Burma, deep-rooted animosity and distrust 
between the military regime and ethnic nationality groups remain. Repatriated refugees will 
continue to be treated with suspicion and have few rights as members of the Burmese polity upon 
their return. The roots of these feelings and beliefs will be explored further in Chapter Three.
40
CHAPTER THREE
L im it s  t o  t h e  R ig h t s  o f  C it iz e n s h ip  in  B u r m a
This chapter will examine the political traditions of Burma that have limited the rights of 
citizenship within the state and the limits to both citizenship and citizen action, particularly for 
ethnic nationalities, under current military rule. Citizenship can be defined as not only official 
status as citizen within the state, but also the ability to engage (whether to support or oppose the 
state, according to Laski) as a member o f the polity without reprisal. To begin, the background of 
Burma’s struggle for independence from colonial rule, the emergence and failure of a post­
independence democratic state and the ensuing and continuing struggles of the ethnic minority 
groups, particularly the Karenni will be presented. This will include an examination of the 
regime’s actions to eliminate ethnic opposition groups through the Four Cuts strategy, the 
assimilation policy of Burmanisation and the regime’s standard model of state development 
(which relies heavily on forced labour and relocation) to reveal the absence of citizenship rights 
in Burma.
The Diversity of Burma’s Population
Burma is bordered by China, Laos, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. With over one 
hundred identified languages, Burma has an ethnic mix that is undoubtedly one o f the most 
complex in the world.’®̂ Of its population o f approximately 48 million, it is estimated that two- 
thirds are ethnically Burman while the remaining one-third of the population is comprised o f a 
wide array of non-Burman ethnic groups. Politically, the country is divided into seven divisions 
which are largely populated by the majority Burmans and seven ethnic minority states which are 
located along the mountainous border regions of the country (Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Shan Karen, 
Karenni and Mon states). Within each state there is a diverse mix of ethnic peoples with some 
state names referring only to the predominant ethnic group in that area (ex. Karenni, Mon and
-41  -
Shan states) while others are collective names for the numerous sub-groups within each state 
(such as the Chin, Kachin and Karen states). There are also Burmans, Chinese and Burmese o f 
Indian descent settled throughout the country.
Burma’s Struggle for Independence
Colonised by the British between 1824 and 1886, the peoples o f Burma spent over sixty 
years resenting their foreign ruler. Major protests erupted during the 1920s by Burma’s 
intelligentsia and Buddhist monks. In 1930 peasants frustrated at increasingly difficult conditions 
and an obvious lack of support from high-level politicians also rebelled. Known as the Hsaya 
San rebellion, 1300 peasants were killed by government troops, while 9000 peasants were 
arrested, captured or surrendered. According to Robert Taylor, the government’s suppression of 
the protest taught the peasants that “there was little they or national leaders could do to protect 
themselves, and independence was the only way of gaining a state that might listen to them.” '°  ̂
Shortly after, in 1935, the Students’ Union at Rangoon University was at the forefront of what 
would become an active and powerful call for independence. A law student named Aung San, 
executive-committee member of the Union, emerged as the potential new leader of the national 
movement.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Aung San along with 29 others left Burma to 
undergo military training in Japan. Known as the ‘Thirty Comrades’, they fought alongside the 
Japanese when they invaded Burma, having been promised their freedom if  the British were 
defeated. It became clear, however, that the Japanese would not live up to their promise and so 
the Comrades switched sides, working to expel the Japanese in May 1945. Hailed as an architect 
of Burma’s liberty from foreign rule, Aung San, the Bogyoke or Major General, negotiated an 
agreement for independence in January 1947 with colonial Britain. An election was held and
Smith, Martin (\999) Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f  Ethnicity. London: Zed Books. p30.
Smith, op. cit. p 30-31.
Taylor, Robert (1987) The State in Burma. London: C. Hurst, p 199.
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Aung San’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, receiving 248 out o f 255 assembly seats, was 
the clear winner. Only six months later on 19 July 1947, Aung San and members of his cabinet 
were assassinated at the bidding of U Saw, a senior politician in pursuit of the country’s 
leadership role. U Nu, a member of cabinet, replaced Aung San as Prime Minister.'®* Despite the 
violent and sudden loss of so many of its political leaders, Burma was granted freedom from 
British rule on 4 January 1948.
The Burmese Way to Socialism
The Government in Rangoon struggled for 14 years “from one political and constitutional 
crisis to another” until 1958 when Ne Win was invited on a temporary basis to take control the 
country, including the ethnic minority states, forcing them to remain under the jurisdiction of the 
central government. Although U Nu was re-elected Prime Minister in 1960, m 1962 Ne Win 
seized power in a military coup that ended Burma's brief era of parliamentary democracy. In 
1974 a new constitution was introduced and Ne Win's Burmese Way to Socialism was 
implemented through the one-party rule of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).'®®
Ne Win’s new Revolutionary Council suspended the constitution and instituted 
authoritarian military rule. The country was closed off from the outside world and attention was 
turned to defeating the communist and ethnic minority opposition groups. For the next three 
decades Ne Win set Burma on a disastrous path of cultural, environmental and economic ruin. 
By 1987, Burma was deemed a Least Developed Country (LDC) by the United Nations (which, 
incidentally, the government wanted in order to secure more UN funding)."®
The following year. Ne Win announced that he was preparing to retire and seeing an 
escape from military rule, thousands of people took to the streets during what became known as 
‘democracy summer’. A series of vicious crackdowns by the Tatmadaw (Burma Army) during
Fink, Christina (2001 ) Living Silence: Burma Ünder Military Rule. London: Zed Books, p 23. 
Ibid., p 28.
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mass democracy protests took the lives of over 10,000 non-violent protesters, most o f them 
students. Thousands more were imprisoned or forced to flee to the border areas. Universities 
were shut as student protests and organising were viewed as serious threats to the stability o f the 
regime. On 18 September 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to 
power in yet another military coup engineered from behind the scenes by Ne Win.’”
In 1990, SLORC called for open and democratic elections, confident that the party would 
win and remain in power. The National League for Democracy (NLD) however, led by Aung 
San Suu Kyi (Aung San’s daughter) received an overwhelming 82 per cent of the popular vote, 
winning 392 out of 484 seats.”  ̂ SLORC refused to accept the election results and consequently 
began to detain and frequently torture democratically elected MPs as well as other party 
members. Despite the election, SLORC continued Ne Win’s legacy o f exercising all legislative, 
executive and judicial powers. Many decrees made by the regime rendered violations o f human 
rights legitimate, according to the UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur.” ^
Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest for ‘endangering the state’ in 1989 and 
was forced to remain there for six years. In 1996, students and other protestors rose up again but 
the military government (renamed State Peace and Development Council on 15 November 1997, 
likely on the advice of a US public relations firm)” '* came down swiftly and violently to repress 
the movement. The universities and colleges of Burma were again closed and for the twelve 
years between 1988 and 2000, were open for a total o f only thirty months.”  ̂ A country with no 
external enemies, the SPDC regime continues to spend up to 60 per cent of the country’s gross 
domestic product on military expenditures that are used against its own citizens.” ^
’ Carey, Peter, ed. ( 1997) Burma: The Challenge o f Change in a Divided Society. London; MacMillan, p xii.
’ ' ' Smith ( 1999) Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f Ethnicity. London: Zed Books (Revised Edition) p 15-16.
Matthews, Bruce. (1999) “Burma/Myanmar. Government à la mode - From SLORC to SPDC: A Change of Public 
Dress-Up and Manner?" Round Table. Issue 349, p 7.
Go, U Ne. (1998) "Moving Towards Human Rights.” Tde/a/de Voices. February/March 1998. p2.
’” lbid.,p. 4.
' The Campaign Committee for Open School, Position Paper on Recent Re-Opening o f  Schools in Burma. 
(http://www.burmaproiect.org/072400 ccos.html. 24 July 2000)
Husarska, Anna. (1999) “Lady in Waiting.” New Republic. Vol.20, Issue 15. p. 2.
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Ethnie Minorities: Aliens in Their Own Land
Although non-Burman ethnic groups make up approximately one-third of the country’s 
population, their continuing struggles for rights and representation within Burma continue to be 
overshadowed by the mainstream democracy movement dominated by the Burman majority.” ’ 
Despite the potential for this to change after the 1990 elections, Matthews notes, “so striking were 
the political problems confronting the majority BaMa [Burmans] in the heartland of the nation 
that regional and ethnic issues became sidelined. Once again, at a critical hour, important ethnic 
constituencies, needs, wants and ambitions went unrepresented.”” *
Historically, the non-Burman ethnic groups focused on the struggle for sovereignty based 
on their customary control of the ethnic territories. Michael Aung Thwin argues there was 
previously a system o f stable tributory relationships between the Burmese majority and the ethnic 
peoples living in the border areas which was compromised by colonialism.”  ̂ Many ethnic 
leaders, however, refute there was ever a fair system established.
In the case o f the Karenni peoples, living primarily in Karenni state, located north of 
Karen state, an agreement signed between the Burmese and British governments in 1875 
recognised the independence of the four western Karenni states. Although Britain annexed the 
eastern state of Kantarawaddy in 1888, (due in large part to the presence of valuable teak stands) 
neither eastern nor western Karenni states were included in the official boundaries of colonial 
Burma.’̂ ° Despite promising varying levels of independence for the Karenni states during the 
late 1800s, the colonial stance shifted in the lead up to Burmese independence. British policies 
began to favour Karenni integration with lowland Burma while the Panglong Agreement of 1947
Smith (1991) op. cit., p 31.
Matthews, Bruce. (2001) “Ethnic and Religious Diversity: Myanmar's Unfolding Nemesis” Visiting Researchers 
Series No. 3, Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p 9.
Aung Thwin, Michael (1985) “The British Pacification of Burma: Order Without Meaning” yot/ma/ o f Southeast 
Asian Studies Vol. XVI, No. 2, pp245 -  262.
Bamforth, Vicky, Steven Lanjouw and Graham Mortimer (2000) Conflict and Displacement in Karenni: The Need 
for Considered Responses, Chiang Mai: Burma Ethnic Research Group, p 29.
- 4 5 -
under the direction of Aung San and the AFPFL attempted to create a federal system that would
incorporate all ethnic groups. Arguing that it was the colonial powers that had kq>t the peoples of
Burma divided, Aung San stated
...there should be no insuperable difficulties in the way of a 
unified Burma provided all races are given full freedom and the 
opportunity to meet together and to work without the interference 
o f outside interests. ...we stand for full freedom of all the races 
of our country, including those so-called Karenni states, and we 
hold strongly the view that no such race and no regime in our 
country should now be denied the fi-uits of the freedom that must 
shortly be achieved by our country and our people.'^’
Thus, the Karenni states were reconstituted into one state and incorporated into an 
independent Burma under the country’s 1947 Constitution. The Panglong Agreement, however, 
granted Karenni and Shan states the right of extraordinary succession after a ten-year trial 
period.'^^ Yet the assassination o f pro-separatist Karenni leader Khu Bee Htu Re on 9 August 
1948 by government military forces resulted in an armed uprising against the AFPFL-backed 
administration in Kantarawaddy. Martial law was imposed throughout the state and this day was 
recognised by subsequent opposition groups as the beginning o f the Karenni nationalist 
uprising.'^^
The right to succession was never granted by the central government despite the clause in 
the Panglong Agreement and so separatist forces came together in 1957 to form the Karenni 
National Progressive Party (KNPP), a political organisation with an armed wing.’̂ '* The KNPP 
has maintained strong resistance to the Burmese government, although the formation of splinter 
groups, beginning with the emergence of the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front 
(KNPLF) in 1978, has weakened the party. Ideologically opposed to the KNPP, the KNPLF 
faction worked in alliance with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The split grew violent
The Times (London), 14 Jan. 1947, as quoted in Smith (1999) op. cit., p 78. 
Smith (1999) op. cit., p 79.
Smith (1999) op. cit., p 112.
Bamforth, et. al, (2000) op. cit., p 31.
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when a KNPLF leader was killed, further contributing to the weakening of the Karenni opposition 
and restricting KNPP access to KNPLF-controlled villages.
In 1995, after a short-lived cease-fire with SLORC, the KNPP lost much of its 
strategically important territory bordering Thailand east of the Salween River, due to an intense 
offensive by the Burmese army. In early 1996 air attacks near the Thai border led to the 
abandonment o f some KNPP bases in the area and their last border military base, Kaut Kaut, fell 
on 27 March 1996.’̂ ® Many Karenni fled to Thailand at this time. Presently, the KNPP is one of 
the only remaining parties continuing the struggle for self-determination in Karenni state, 
controlling about twenty-five percent o f the state and maintaining a parallel administration in the 
Karenni refugee camps on the Thai border.'^’
The historical implications o f colonialism and the ethnic struggle remain for the 
Karenni as well as other ethnic nationality groups. According to Smith, the British rarely 
interfered with the traditional governing systems o f the Karenni and other ethnic minority groups 
throughout their rule.’̂ * Yet Taylor notes that the British favoured certain ethnic groups 
(particularly Karen, Karenni and Chin) and gave them leadership positions under colonial rule 
which then “backfired after independence because the Burma government felt that the ethnic 
groups were traitors and hence did not deserve the same rights as the majority Burmans.” '̂ ® 
Aung Thwin uses this argument to justify the overthrow o f democratic rule in 1962 as a way to 
restore order to Burmese society. Burma scholars such as Taylor and Aung Thwin see the roots 
of ethnic discontent through this lens. The view that the ethnic nationalities are less worthy of 
rights than the Burman majority is clearly revealed by the actions o f the successive military
Bamforth, et. al, (2000) op. cit, p 34-35.
Project Ploughshares, (2000) Armed Conflicts Report 2000: Burma. Waterloo, Canada: Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies (httD://www.Dloughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/ACROO/ACROO-Burma.html. 28 July 2001), p 3. See 
also ABSDF, ( 1997) Forced Relocation and Human Rights Abuses in Karenni State, Burma. Bangkok: ABSDF. 
(http://www.geocities.eom/CapitolHill/Lobbv/3190/public/kmreD.txt. 28 July 2001) p 2-3.
Bamforth, et. al, (2000) op. cit., p 35.
Smith (1991), op cit. p 33.
Taylor (1987), op cit. p 222.
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regimes. The rights to citizenship in Burma, dubious as they are under a dictatorship, remain 
unattainable for the ethnic nationality groups.’ ®̂
Government Rule Restricting Rights
The military regimes in Burma have consistently and illegitimately ruled the country
without the input o f its citizens, including the Burman majority. As Curt Lambrecht notes.
Power is highly centralised with few institutional provisions for 
the involvement of the citizenry in policy-maJdng. As a 
consequence, the government’s domestic policies are often 
uninformed by the needs o f the populace and unacceptable to 
them. Lacking legitimacy throughout the country, the principal 
means by which the regime has maintained its hold on power 
and implemented its policies has been through violence and 
repression.’̂ '
The non-Burman ethnic groups, perceived as threats to the security o f the country due to 
their firequent opposition to the regime have been subjected to government policies that deny 
them their rights. More aggressively, the military has actively pursued policies to eliminate 
opposition groups. These aims have been pursued through the Four Cuts and Burmanisation 
strategies common throughout the border regions, with dire consequences for these ethnic groups.
Pya Ley Pya (The Four Cuts Campaign)
Throughout 1984-1990, a counter-insurgency strategy carried out by the Burmese 
military in the border areas, known as Pya Ley Pya (Four Cuts Campaign) aimed to cut off access 
to the four main necessities o f opposition groups - food, funds, intelligence and recruits - through
Immigrants and their children also face discrimination based on ethnicity resulting in limited access to education 
and loss of other rights that citizens are granted. Christina Fink explains that, “Indian and Chinese children who have 
been denied full citizenship are not allowed to attend the medical or technological institutes.... Although these children 
were bom in Burma, as were most of their parents, the military regime did not continue the parliamentary government’s 
policy of granting automatic citizenship to life-time foreign residents. Fink (2001 ) op cit., p 117.
Lambrecht, Curtis (2000) “Destruction and Violation: Burma’s border development policies” Watershed Vol. 5 No.
2 (November 1999 — February 2000) p 31.
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the use of “strategic hamletting”.’̂  ̂ A key component of this tactic includes the forced relocation 
of villagers to locations secured by the military where they can then be used as ‘volunteer’ (i.e. 
forced) labour for the army. It has been argued that the Four Cuts Campaign by the Burmese 
army has been one of the most bmtal military operations since independence. Extra-judicial 
killings, systematic rape, and torture were perpetrated simultaneously. In addition, villages were 
burnt, crops confiscated, and fields destroyed, eliminating any chance o f food security for the 
impacted civilians. During this time, particularly 1984-88, villagers in these areas started to flee 
over the border into Thailand in order to escape the continuing atrocities.
Burmanisation: In Pursuit o f  Ethnic Assimilation
In the words of Clifford Geertz, the “vigorously assimilationist policies” of 
Burmanisation, as undertaken by the military government, rest upon highly discriminatory ideas 
regarding ethnicity.'^'* Promoted by the military, the idea purports that Burmans sit at the top of 
an ethnically based hierarchy. The assimilation o f the diverse ethnic peoples into the mainstream 
Burman culture is promoted because they are considered infMor to the dominant group and 
thought to be a threat to national unity.'^^
Other policies have been put in place by the military government to not only assimilate 
but to eliminate the ethnic minorities but also increase the strength of the Burman majority. This 
has been done through the rape of ethnic minority women, the denial of indigenous languages and 
cultures and, as explained in the Four Cuts approach, massive violations o f human rights in order 
to root out opposition forces.
Smith (1999) op.cit., p 259.
Smith (1991) op. cit., p 397.
As noted in Amott, David (1997) Once the Ricebowl o f Asia: The military destruction o f Burma's economy 
(http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/ricebowl98.htm 23 April 2001).
Ibid.
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Sexual Violence against Ethnic Minority Women
It has been argued that SPDC soldiers, as part of the government’s Burmanisation
strategy of assimilation, systematically use rape as a tool o f war against ethnic minority women in
order to change the ethnic balance as well as to demoralize and terrorise ethnic communities,
particularly the women. According to Betsy Apple, “the Tatmadaw ideology vilifies both ethnic
minorities and women”' a n d  this is clearly revealed through their actions. As one Karen
villager explains
The soldiers tell us that KNU [Karen National Union] nation is 
their enemy and we are the KNU people. The Karen girls are the 
KNU people so they rape them. They say to us there must not be 
any other nationalities in Burma, just the Burman.’̂ ^
Soldiers also coerce women from non-Burman ethnicities to marry them after 
perpetuating unwanted physical contact including rape. The effect of this ‘tool’ is not only a 
pervasive sense of fear and oppression, but also results in ethnic minority women becoming 
pregnant and bearing children considered ethnically Burman. Central to this strategy is the use o f 
patrilineal lines of descent in which both males and females belong to their father’s kin group. In 
this system, therefore, the child’s ethnicity, even in cases o f rape, is based only on the father’s 
ethnicity.
It is also reported by women who have escaped from such terror that HIV-positive 
soldiers are more likely to be sent to perpetuate these gross violations of women’s human rights 
with the intention of spreading the disease to the ethnic populations.’̂ * Despite the military 
regime’s ratification o f the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, (CEDAW) on 21 August 1997, sexual violence against women continues to be
Apple, Betsy (1998) School for Rape: The Burmese Military and Sexual Violence. Bangkok: EarthRights, pp. 94. 
Ibid., p 97.
Greer, Jed and Tyler Giannini (2001 ) Valued Less Than a Milk Tin: Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in 
Burma by the Ruling Military Regime. Washington D.C.: EarthRights International, p 39.
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systematically perpetrated by the SPDC.'^^ Shan and Karen women’s and human rights 
organisation’s have recently documented and produced comprehensive reports about the ongoing 
and shocking cases of systematic rape in their regions.
The Denial o f  Indigenous Languages and Cultures
The denial and restriction of indigenous languages and culture remains a central feature
of the discriminatory practices pursued by the military government. Though essential to cultural
identity, the use of languages other than Burmese has been highly restricted throughout Burma.
Ethnic minority students attending state schools must receive instruction and speak only in
Burmese, which is usually their second or third language. The teaching o f ethnic minority
languages, even as a second language, is absolutely forbidden in the state-run schools, even when
the schools are in areas populated primarily by ethnic minorities. A student attending school in
Shan state explains
There are no Shan teachers in the official school.... The teachers just 
came fi-om Mandalay or Rangoon, but I don’t know why they are not 
Shan teachers. Maybe the military doesn’t want them to be Shan 
teachers because they want the students to leam the Burmese language.
If Shan people have a chance to leam Shan language, they will have to 
leam Shan history. The military would like to conceal Shan history and 
culture so that the children would not gain knowledge about that. This 
prevents Shan people fi-om rebelling.’"*’
With the lack of instmction in one’s indigenous language comes the belief that the 
Buiman language and culture are more advanced than those o f the ethnic minority groups. 
According to Greer and Giannini, “Where Burma’s dilapidated educational system does function,
The Women's Rights Project and The Burma UN Service Office (1998) The Situation o f Women in Burma: A 
Review o f Women’s Rights in the Context o f the Convention on the Elimination ofAII Forms ofDiscrimination Against 
Women (httD://wwv/.earthrights.org/women/document.html. 26 August 2001 ) p 4.
See Karen Women's Organization (2004) SHATTERING SILENCES: Karen Women speak out about the Burmese 
Military Regime’s use of Rape as a Strategy of War in Karen State and Shan Human Rights Foundation and Shan 
Women's Action Network (2002) LICENSE TO RAPE: The Burmese military regime's use of sexual violence in the 
ongoing war in Shan State for the most recent and accurate information regarding the use of sexual violence as 
government policy against ethnic nationalities women.
Greer, Jed and Tyler Giannini (2001 ) Valued Less Than a Milk Tin: Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in 
Burma by the Ruling Military Regime. Washington D C.: EarthRights International, p 23.
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there has been a concerted effort by the military regime to use education as a means to instil in 
minorities a notion of Burman superiority.” '̂*̂ In addition, Fink notes that “it is in the regime’s 
interest that fluency in other languages be gradually eliminated and minority populations become 
assimilated into the Burman majority population. In this way there will be less basis for minority 
claims against the state’s unifying projects.” ''*̂  Such overt discrimination against ethnic 
nationality groups has resulted in the declining use and knowledge of indigenous languages and 
the decline o f indigenous customs and culture. The cumulative effect of these Burmanisation 
strategies on the ethnic minority peoples has been immense and has severely hmited their rights.
State Development: The SPDC Vision
The military leaders o f Burma have coerced people particularly from the border regions 
of the country to participate in activities they refer to as developmental. Unlike Korten’s 
definition o f development as strategies focusing on improving the capacities o f the people to 
better meet their own needs through self-reliant local action, the aim of the SPDC is to maintain 
their hold on power through control of the land and an increase in revenue via the export of the 
country’s resources. Development as undertaken by the SPDC has been widely critiqued by the 
UN, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who have documented and condemned the 
regime for human rights abuses that take place in the name of development.*'*'* The International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) expelled Burma from its ranks in 1998 in response to the military’s 
continued use of forced labour on development projects such as hotel constmction and foreign-
Fink (2001) op cit., p 176.
Ibid., p 22.
‘1
In April 2000 the UN Commission on Human Rights made its annual statement deploring conditions of abuse in 
Burma. It states, “The continuing pattern of gross and systemic violations of human rights abuses in Myanmar 
[Burma], including extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, particularly in areas of ethnic tension, and enforced 
disappearances, torture, harsh prison conditions, abuse of women and children by government agents, arbitrary seizures 
of land and property, and the imposition of oppressive measures directed in particular at ethnic and religious minorities, 
including systemic programmes of forced relocation, destruction of crops and fields, the continued widespread use of 
forced labour, including for work on infrastructure, production of food for the military and as porters for the army; 
[and] the continued violations of the human rights of, and widespread discriminatory practices against persons 
belonging to minorities...[has resulted] in the large-scale displacement of persons and flows of refugees.” As quoted in 
EarthRights International (2000) Total Denial Continues; Earth Rights Abuses Along the Yadana and Yetagun
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funded energy progranunes.'"^^ This section will examine the activities of the State Peace and 
Development Council’s vision of development and the effects on the country’s citizens. This 
includes an examination of Ministry fo r  Progress o f  Border Areas and Development o f  National 
Races, the building o f foreign-financed infrastructure projects in and near the border areas and the 
resultant human rights abuses common to these projects.
Development and Forced Relocation
Since 1990, the SPDC, under the auspices of the Ministry fo r  Progress o f  Border Areas 
and Development o f  National Races, has worked to implement the ‘all round development’ of 
rural populations. The program, which aims to promote national unity and help secure basic 
needs through the use of rural relocation, considers former insurgents who have given up their 
weapons and village populations already displaced due to the ongoing civil war as eligible to 
‘participate’. The areas from which people are chosen include those that are “isolated from other 
regions of the country and lagging behind in all areas o f development including economic and 
social [sic].” '‘̂  In actuality this differs httle from other attempts at forced relocation that have 
taken place in both rural and urban areas against the will o f the communities involved.
An additional example of forced relocation for development purposes has emerged with 
the building of the Yadana and Yetagun natural gas pipelines, financed by international oil 
companies. Starting from the Andaman Sea and traversing 60 kilometres of Burmese soil before 
it crosses over into Thailand, the building of the pipeline is contingent upon a military presence 
along the pipeline corridor. In early 1993 Karen villages near the pipeline route were forced to 
move closer to the military outposts in order to stop villagers from contacting or supporting 
armed opposition groups. This pohcy of forced relocations by the Burmese army was thought to
In August 1998 the ILO’s Commission of Enquiry published a comprehenâve report on Burma’s failure to 
implement the provisions of ILO Convention No. 29 on forced labour, and states that the SPDC was guilty of “an 
international crime that is also, if committed in a widespread or systematic manner, is a crime against humanity.” 
Amnesty International 1999 Report, p. 257.
MPBANRDA, 1994 as quoted in Bamforth, e l ed, (2000) op. cit, p 55.
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eliminate any local resistance and ensure the security o f the pipeline.''’’ To convince people to
relocate, the military used threats and violence. One villager explains the way in which the orders
to relocate were given.
SLORC told the village head, “your village has to move in one 
month starting from today. After one month, your village will be 
a free-fire zone.” Then no villager dared to stay, so everyone 
moved.''’*
Other ethnic areas have also faced forced relocation due to so-called development 
projects including the building of dams and hydropower plants. In Karenni State, for instance, 
the building o f the Lawpita hydropower plant (Balauchaung I) in the early 1960s resulted in the 
displacement o f thousands o f people.''” When the plant was renovated in 1991 several more 
villages near the plant were forcibly relocated to secure the area from ethnic insurgents. 
Landmines were also laid in order to ensure villagers did not attempt to continue living or 
farming in the area. The hydroelectricity produced is sent to the large urban centres including 
Mandalay and the capital o f Rangoon (Yangon) while, as KNPP foreign minister Saw Doh Say 
states, “the Karennis [near the plant] don’t have a single light [bulb]. They have to buy candles 
to bum.”'^"
Besides the military’s attempt to ensure the Karenni opposition does not interfere with 
the hydro plants in the area (the KNPP’s armed wing attacked and damaged a plant in 1996) the 
forced relocations, according to the ABSDF, were also used to pressure the KNPP into signing a 
cease-fire agreement. This was in the hopes that the area would then become secure enough to 
open up to tourists during the “Visit Myanmar” tourism promotion of 1996. The KNPP estimated
M PB A N R D A , 1994 as quoted  in Bam forth, et. al, (2000) op. c it., p  55.
EarthRights International (2000) op. cit., p 39.
Ibid. Note: “Free-fire zones” refer to the policy whereby the Burmese military considers any person remaining in the 
villages after the relocation deadline has passed to be enemies of the state. Anyone seen by the military will be shot on 
sight. For more details see the Karen Human Rights Group, (1997) Free-Fire Zones in Southern Tenasserim: An 
Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group, August 20,1997:KHRG #97-09, 
(httD:/Avww.ibiblio.ors/freeburma/humanrishts/khre'/archive/khrs97/khre9709.html. 25 June 2001)
Bamforth, et al, (2001) op. cit., p 64-65.
Capital Watch Asia Pacific (2001) Ethnie Karennis protest Japanese aid for Myanmar hydropower plant. 
(http://pesean.uhome.net/capitalwatch/newsroom/b010426.html. 28 July, 2001)
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in 1997 that out of a population of 300,000, up to 75,000 people had already been affected by 
large-scale relocation in Karenni State.'^’ It is evident that relocation o f villagers against their 
will and without their input is a key component of development projects implemented by the 
SPDC.
Forced Labour as a Component o f Development
As a method of development, forced labour is also widespread and systematic in Burma. 
According to Giannini and Greer, “The military has long considered its citizenry to be a ready 
source o f free labour and thus has tried to develop Burma literally on the backs o f its people, 
especially ethnic minorities.”’^̂  This has included clearing land for road construction, cutting 
lumber/bamboo, building barracks and heliports. Many of the activities are components o f larger 
infrastructure projects such as internationally financed pipelines and hydroelectric dams. These 
projects have not been discussed with those who will be affected by them, nor those forced to 
build them, often without pay and always with overt threats of violence.
International oil companies including Unocal (United States), Total (France) and Premier 
(United Kingdom) have also contributed to the widespread use of forced labour in the pipeline 
region. Although “the pipelines bring the army, which lives off the people and brings poverty, 
oppression, and cultural destruction, along with the violence that destroys their lives,” oil 
companies consistently claim that the only effect is to bring development to the people.’^̂  
Despite the overwhelming evidence collected revealing the forced labour used during the pipeline 
construction, the oil companies continue to present their work as highly beneficial to the citizens 
of Burma. As the Unocal web site asserts, the corporation sees its self as “being a good corporate 
citizen wherever we work. We believe that Myanmar will be a better country in the future
ABSDF (1997) op. cit. pp. 4 and 6.
Greer and Giannini, (2001) op. cit., p 28.
EarthRights International (2000) op. cit., p 100.
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because o f our investment today.” Yet it is difficult to agree that forcing people to work for a 
military government without choice or pay are the actions o f a good corporate citizen. One NGO 
working on the issue o f human rights and environmental abuses in Burma is currently 
representing plaintiffs from Burma in a lawsuit against Unocal for the abuses perpetuated during 
the pipeline construction.
Members o f the Thai Government, also party to this project, have admitted knowledge of
the abuses found along the pipeline corridor. Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Sukumbhand
Paribatra spoke out about the economic and political effects o f the deal. He states
Our links with SLORC grew very strongly because of the 
business interests— what happened was that the minorities who 
used to be our buffer were crushed, on the one hand, between 
SLORC’s growing state power and...our...greed for natural 
resources.... I regret very strongly that...the Petroleum 
Authority o f Thailand...was part of a deal which bought gas 
from Burma, and hence opened up the suppression o f the Karens 
[and others] in the area where the gas pipeline has to pass.’̂ ^
In the case of the SPDC, so-called ‘development’ projects are outside driven, exploitative 
and destructive to the lives of the local people. The systematic use of forced relocation and forced 
labour in addition to Four Cuts offensives and Burmanisation policies, including the systematic 
use of sexual violence, have contributed to the continued marginalisation of the ethnic nationality 
groups, evident by the sharp increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) found 
throughout Burma. Though exact numbers are unknown, analysts estimate that there are now 
betweai one and two million IDPs living in dire circumstances throughout Burma due to the 
highly abusive and destructive nature o f the regime’s rule.'^^
Treated as less deserving of rights than the Burma majority, the ethnic minority groups 
are consistently denied participation in development and other decisions directly affecting their
See www.unocal.com. 18 September 2001. 
EarthRights International (2000) op. cit, p 167.
Norwegian Refugee Council, “IDPs in Myanmar (Burma)” Global IDP Database. 
(httD://www.db.idDDroiect.ors/Sites/idDSurvev.nsf/wViewSineleEnv/MYanmar+(BurmaIProfilei-Summarv. 25 August, 
2001)
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livelihoods and ability to survive within Burma. For those forced to flee to Thailand to avoid the 
SPDC’s border development projects, the result is a long-term, tightly controlled existence in 
Thai refugee camps. Coming from the political tradition of being denied rights or freedoms, in 
what capacity can the Karenni and others ethnic nationalities who have become refugees work for 
the betterment o f their communities and influence the larger issues as future citizens within a 
democratic Burma? Returning to the primary question o f this study, how are NGOs providing 
assistance in the camps and are they working in collaboration with the refugee population to 
increase the likelihood of citizen-led participatory development now and in the future? These 
issues will be addressed in the following chapter.
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C h a pt e r  F o u r
NGO Pr o g r a m m in g  on  t h e  T h a i-Bu rm ese  Bo r d e r : I n Sea r c h  o f  C it iz e n sh ip
Our role is to help change a refugee camp from something to survive in to a time
and place fo r  growth.
Mark Raper, Jesuit Refugee Service
The transformation of refugee camps from locations of strict control and limited rights, to 
a ‘time and place for growth’ has been a controversial idea since refugee camps on the Thai- 
Burma were first established in the 1980s. This ‘search for citizenship’ has not progressed in a 
linear fashion, but has been strongly influenced by multiple factors including fluctuating Thai 
policies towards refugees, the introduction of a UNHCR presence and the role of NGO processes 
and programming. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the processes and programming 
undertaken in the camps in order to assess the ability of NGOs to engage in activities promoting 
‘citizen action’ by refugees.
Background
Prior to official camps being set up in Thailand, people primarily from the neighbouring 
ethnic states (Karen, Mon and Karenni) sporadically crossed over from Burma to avoid the dry 
season offensive by the Burmese army. They would then return to their villages when the army 
had retreated. Over time the offensives increased in frequency and intensity resulting in 
destroyed crops, land being seized and villages forcibly relocated, making it impossible for the 
villagers to safely return to Burma.
Refugees began to set up rural camps near the Burmese border. Most are located in 
mountainous jungle terrain. Each family must build their own bamboo shelter on a small plot of
Although this thesis deals specifically with the refugee situation in Thailand, people living in western Burma, 
particularly the Rohingya, have also fled fi-om Burma to India and Bangladesh to escape from their brutal repression in 
Arakan State. For more information see Lewa, Chris, (2003) The Plight o f  Burma’s Stateless, Rohingya Muslims Asia 
Forum for Human Rights and Development, fhttp://www.twf.org/News/Y2003/0630-Buima.html. July 2004)
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land. Communal wells provide the water supply and sanitation systems have been introduced by 
relief agencies. There is no electricity or running water and cooking is done over an open flame, 
using either wood or charcoal. Roads, if they exist, are often washed out in the rainy season and 
people must navigate rivers and streams by foot and the narrow paths between huts and through 
the jungle in order to access the different sections of the camps. The camps have primary 
schools, churches, temples and usually a primary health care clinic. Refugees run small teashops, 
barbershops and dry goods stores with supplies periodically brought in by Thai merchants. 
Checkpoints are fixed at camp entrances where visitors and NGO workers must possess official 
passes in order to be admitted by the Thai military. Refugees are not officially permitted to leave 
the camps although arrangements are occasionally made with the Thai authorities for permission 
to travel to nearby cities or villages.
Originally, with more than 30 camps spread out along the border, camps remained small 
and replicated the village structures from which the refugees had fled. With the increasing belief 
by Thai authorities that refugees should be repatriated to Burma, the Ministry o f Interior has 
begun to consolidate camps in an effort to increase their control over the movement of refugees. 
This has resulted in fewer, more crowded camps with much larger populations along the entire 
border. In 2003 and 2004 both a Karenni and Karen camp were closed and residents forced to 
relocate to camps closer to the Burmese border. The number of refugees in these camps is now 
estimated at more than 142,000. As of February 2004, there were over 22,000 refugees living 
within the two Karenni refugee camps located in Mae Hong Son province in north-western 
Thailand, 117,000 inhabitants in eight Karen refugee camps and more than 12,000 Mon in 
resettlement sites just inside the Burma border.*^* These numbers do not take into account the 
thousands of people from Burma’s Shan state that have also fled from human rights abuses but 
have been denied refugee status or the setting up of refugee camps along the Shan-Thai border by
BBC February 2004 Population Figures.
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the Thai govemment.’^̂  For an overview o f current camp locations and populations on the Thai- 
Burmese border, see Appendix 2.
Political and Administrative Structures in the Camps
The political and administrative structures in the camps influence the way that NGOs can 
operate within the camps. Each camp committee is comprised o f the camp and section leaders. 
Under the jurisdiction of ethnic parties, the camp committees are responsible for the day-to-day 
administration of the camps. This includes registering new arrivals, births and deaths, resolving 
disputes, maintaining social harmony and ensuring internal camp security.
The camps also have refugee committees which seek out and co-ordinate donor funding 
for programming and projects in the camps. In the case of the Karenni Refugee Committee 
(KnRC), their mandate deals with external issues affecting all the camps such as Thai security, 
the international assistance programmes and UNHCR policies. NGOs with official programming 
in the camps usually work closely with these committees. See Appendix 3 for a diagram of the 
Karenni Refugee Camp Committee administrative structure.
Thai Assistance Policies
NGOs working along the Thai-Burma border are restricted by the Thai government from 
implementing projects that might be deemed “pull factors” by the victims o f Burmese military 
oppression. By offering assistance and services that are not available on the Burmese side of the 
border, the Thai government fears that NGOs will be responsible for more and more people 
coming into the country. It is for this reason that only the most essential and basic assistance 
mandates are permitted for any organisation working on this border. The most common types of
For more information regarding the plight of Shan refugees in Thailand see, 
http://www.shanland.org/HR/HR Frame.htm.
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assistance in the camps include primary health care and sanitation, education and rations
(including food and other basic necessities).
NGOs working officially in the camps have permission from the Thai Ministry of Interior
(MGI). Though the health and education sectors remain the most visible in terms of assistance
programming, other non-registered NGOs provide training on the environment, human rights,
gender and community management. Computer and video documentation skills have been taught
by advocacy NGOs while agricultural training and small income generation projects have also
take place. Non-registered NGOs, considered to be operating illegally, must remain discreet as
Thai authorities will periodically ‘raid’ organisations and shut them down if  their programming
becomes too open or controversial.
Influencing NGO programming, Thai policies in the camps have changed over time jfrom
“what was a relatively free and open climate, which encouraged refugees to be as autonomous as
possible, to really the reverse. Now they are facing more and more restrictions everyday, more
controls...”'^  In fact, the situation for the Karen refugees was far more open when they first
arrived in Thailand. A NGO spokeswoman explains.
The Thais in the beginning let [the refugees] take care of themselves. They 
encouraged them to be as self-sufficient as possible except they didn’t allow 
them to plant rice. But aside fi-om that they allowed them to cut bamboo in the 
forest, they allowed them to build their own camps.... They didn’t contain 
them.'^’
Current Thai policies do not allow refugees to forage in the forests, cut trees or bamboo, 
or plant vegetable gardens. Refugees also cannot go outside the camps to work in nearby villages 
or farms. If caught doing any o f the above, they are denied food rations for up to 2 months and 
given punishment of 15 days hard labour inside the camp.'® Self-sufficiency has not been 
promoted and the need for humanitarian assistance, therefore, has not declined.
Interview 30C, on file with author.
' Interview 30C, on file with author.
■ Camp Policies as quoted in paper b; 
of Karenni Refugees in Camp #1”, unpublished research paper.
y Khu Lee Peh (2004) “Crossing the Thai-Burma Border for Survival: The Case
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The Nongovernmental Organisations
Although there are many types of nongovernmental organisations on the Thai-Burma 
border, the primary distinctions identified in this study are international NGOs (INGO) and local 
(Thailand-based) NGOs (LNGO).
International NGOs normally have projects and field offices in various locations around 
the world. Their operations on this border are typically only one aspect o f their overall work. 
Head offices are generally located in the nations o f the global north, although some advocacy- 
based INGOs are located in Southeast Asia. Both primary health care and education/teacher 
training, though run by the refugee government departments, are supported by international 
NGOs.
Local (Thai-based) NGOs, fall into two categories. The first, often run by expatriates, 
were formed in specific response to the refugee crisis on the Thai-Burmese border. The most 
well known o f these organisations is the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) which provides 
basic food rations, building materials, cooking fuel, sleeping mats and mosquito nets to the camp 
inhabitants. On the border since 1984, the BBC negotiated with the refugees and the Thai 
authorities in order to provide relief assistance to refugees along the entire b o r d e r . O t h e r  local 
NGOs have mandates that focus on women’s rights and gender, income generation activities, 
nursery school programmes, community management courses, medics training, research and 
advocacy work. Many local organisations have a mixture of Thai, foreign and Burmese staff.
The second type of LNGOs are those formed by refugees. Although there are numerous 
Burmese political organisations and parties operating in exile from Thailand, only recently have 
NGOs formed by peoples from Burma emerged in greater numbers. The first ones were offshoots 
of ethnic govemments-in-exile and other political opposition groups. Other groups formed after
Burmese Border Consortium (2000) ReliefProgramme: Programme Report for the Period January to June 2000. 
Bangkok, Thailand, p 32.
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receiving training from local and international NGOs. Their level ,of independence varies from 
group to group. Refugee-led NGOs include women’s groups, environmental NGOs, development 
groups focusing on IDP relief assistance within Burma, as well as media, advocacy and human 
rights organisations.
By comparing process and programming among these different organisations, it is hoped 
a clearer model for engaging refugee-as-citizen will emerge. This section will refer to the criteria 
outlined in Chapter One in order to examine the challenges and successes of NGOs in both their 
programming and processes.
Criteria fo r  NGOs
Referring back to the literature in Chapter One, NGOs acknowledging the ability of 
refugees to act as citizens in the struggle for social change are those utilising a participatory 
development framework. This framework, combining aspects from Korten’s and McDonald’s 
work, consists of programming/process that;
1) Facilitates just, sustainable and inclusive development action in order to change policies 
and institutions at all levels (Korten’s 3*̂  Generation Strategy).
2) Energizes a critical mass o f independent, decentralised (refugee-led) initiatives in support 
of a common social vision (Korten’s 4* Generation Strategy).
3) Utilises participation that encourages people to be active participants in all aspects of the 
processes intended to improve their lives and transform the contexts and conditions 
within which they live (McDonald’s Participation as Political Empowerment).
In a camp setting, capacity building initiatives are activities with the potential to encourage 
refugee-led social change. The following section will examine the successes and challenges of 
both INGOs and LNGOs that have implemented capacity building activities with refugee 
populations. In addition, encouraging solidarity linkages between those in the camps with other
- 6 3  -
groups/communities in order to facilitate the sharing of ideas, research, solutions and experiences 
is another aspect of participatory development that strengthens a common social vision. The role 
o f NGO solidarity efforts will also be examined.
Capacity Building as a Participatory Development Strategy
Capacity building as a part of NGO programming has over time become more accepted 
by both development-oriented NGOs and relief organisations. This type of programming has the 
potential to encourage the formation of independent refugee organisations that have the 
confidence and ability to work towards social change. As a member o f the National Council of 
the Union of Burma (the de facto parliament under military rule) remarks, “In the camps there is 
no opportunity for higher education, but NGOs are implementing some capacity building 
programs... We take it very seriously, this need for capacity building and transitional training.” ’̂
Not an objective in itself, capacity building implies ‘‘'both a set o f activities and a strategic 
approach aimed at securing sustainable change in institutional and/or human behaviour.”’ Yet 
are nongovernmental organisations working with Burmese refugees in Thailand able to create 
such change through their capacity building programming? The following section will present 
the challenges and successes of an international relief organisation using capacity building 
activities as a part of their programming on the Thai-Burma border.
An International Medical NGO’s Experience with Capacity Building
International NGOs have been primarily engaged in humanitarian efforts in the refugee 
camps. Nonetheless, some of these organisations have also been able to stretch their mandate in 
order to engage in capacity building programs. This section will examine the experiences and 
activities of one international NGO providing primary health care services in the Karenni refugee
Interview with NCUB Foreign Affairs Committee member. Interview 28LB, on file with author. 
Furley, Kemlin and Jenifer Otsea (1999) op. cit., p 5.
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camps.
In 1992 this international medical NGO, in cooperation with the Karenni Health 
Department, began providing health care as well as water and sanitation assistance to Karenni 
refugees. They expanded their programming with an internship programme in 1995 which aimed 
to build skills for young educated refugees from the camp to be able to work with the Karenni 
Government with increased capabilities to n e g o t i a t e .L a t e r  a gap was identified revealing other 
organisations in the camps also needed training and the program expanded to become the 
Capacity Building Program (GBP) in 1997.
Through the GBP, moves were made to strengthen the Karenni Refugee Committee 
(KnRC) and provide training to camp section leaders, assistants and Karenni NGOs. Activities 
through the GBP have included Community Development training for camp section leaders, 
organisation and management training for the KnRC and KHD; access to small grants for food 
security projects, educational support and income generating activities.'^^
Knowing their mandate with a refugee community is finite, this NGO emphasises
training those in the camps to take over their programming and activities in the future. “Our
strategy is to increase the capacities of the refugees themselves so they can manage the projects
themselves in the camps with the KnRG.”’ *̂ Many o f these activities focus on building the skills
o f refugee committee members and leaders with the hope that these groups will then initiate
further training and skills-building among the general camp population. Speaking of the
processes involved in these activities, the GBP manager says.
Capacity building isn’t just about training. It’s about allowing people 
the opportunity to develop the awareness that they can do things 
themselves, self-leaming is the best learning while [our role is to] 
encourage them.’ ®̂
The need for this type of capacity building emerged after a KNPP ceasefire with the Burmese military broke down 
after only three months. It was thought that improving the negotiating skills of those in the Karenni Government could 
result in a clearer agreement in any future negotiations.
NGO literature, Capacity Building Program: Burma Border Program. Mae Hong Son, Thailand, (Unpublished 
document).
Interview with NGO staff member, 26JB on file with author.
Interview 26JB on file with author.
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A graduate of this NGO’s initial internship programme who transitioned into a staff 
member o f the capacity building program explains his role and ability to pass his knowledge on to 
others;
At first the capacity-building coordinator asked me to translate 
all the [training materials] into Burmese.... After two or three 
modules, he asked me to teach by myself, but...gave me 
feedback. I enjoyed it and I'm used to it now because most o f the 
people are familiar with me and...when I teach them they can 
understand directly and they can ask whatever they want to 
know, they can clarify with me.'™
By engaging and mobilising community leaders, this relief organisation has been 
successful at utilising Korten’s Generation strategy to develop the capacities o f people in the 
camps to better meet their own needs in terms of local training and the running o f refugee-led 
organisations. Challenges also exist, however, for INGOs implementing capacity building 
programs as a means to engage refugees as active participants in their struggle for change. These 
will be examined in the following section.
Challenges o f Capacity Building by INGOs
In this case of a relief-mandated INGO implementing capacity building programming, 
three main challenges have been identified. These include securing permission and funding for 
development-focused activities, reaching a diverse group of beneficiaries/participants (such as 
youth, women and underrepresented sub-ethnic groups and religions) and the tension between 
controlling decisions and resources versus encouraging the formation of independent refugee-led 
organisations.
In trying to promote development-focused activities in the camps, the INGO’s Field 
Director noted that the move away fi-om its traditional relief role remained limited. The first issue
INGO refugee staff member (interview 14H), on file with author.
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is the limitation on permitted activities by the Thai Ministry o f Interior. He explains, “There’s no 
chance for [official] development for the refugee population...because Thailand doesn’t want 
development o f this population in Thailand.... They don’t want refugees to get settled here.”^̂ *
Another staff member perceived the challenge o f expanding beyond relief activities as an
organisational issue saying, “The capacity building programme is not a big thing in [the
organisation] overall. No one [from the organisation] is doing development in other places.” '̂ ^
Part of this challenge is the perceived preference among donors for relief programming. The
CBP manager o f this NGO explains,
In a relief setting you can control everything. Setting the number 
o f doctors, the amount o f pay for staff, etc. So a donor with tight 
controls is happy. But there is less control in development 
[programming]; accountability less easy to control. Donors don’t 
like it.'^
With limited support by the Thai government and donors, as well as an organisational 
mandate that remains focused on direct services to the camp population, capacity building 
programming continues to be only a small part of this humanitarian organisation’s work on the 
border.
Reaching a diverse group of beneficiaries through capacity building training is also a 
challenge for this INGO. Given the structures within the camps, participants usually remain 
limited to those with a position within the Karenni government or a relationship with decision­
makers. This is a challenge common to other groups providing training programs as well. It is 
difficult to significantly broaden the pool o f those receiving training because INGOs usually use 
well-established networks such as the ethnic government bodies or the refugee camp committees. 
(If an outside NGO attempts to recruit participants without any relationship or consultation with 
the camp leaders, the project may be criticised or rejected by the leaders.) The capacity building
Interview 16JN, on file with author. 
Interview 26JB, on file with author. 
Interview 26JB, on file with author.
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and training programme of this international NGO, connected closely to the KHD and the camp 
committee, has therefore been most effective in strengthening the abilities and knowledge o f 
those already connected to leaders and organisations within their community. This expectation is 
that these trained leaders will then pass on their knowledge and skills to others in the camps.
A local refugee leader, however, urges INGOs to consider more comprehensive support 
for the wider community saying “ ...without political civil education for everybody, if  people at 
the grassroots cannot understand and participate, no government can keep democracy alive. So 
the international community should look at this strategy.”’’"* Local power holders in the camps 
also need to open up opportunities to a wider range of people in their communities such as 
women, Muslims and sub-ethnic groups who may have been overlooked for participation in 
capacity building activities in the past.
Finally, the tension between controlling decisions and resources versus supporting the
formation o f independent refugee-led organisations has also emerged as an issue in this case.
Though refugee control and decision-making is often promoted by international NGOs,
Responsibility for meaningful decision-making cannot be separated 
from the resources necessary to carry out decisions taken... [if the 
agencies] are unwilling to relinquish any of the economic means 
which would enable refugee self-management to occur, they will 
defeat the proposed objectives of refugee self-govemance and 
democratic process.” *
The strong control of resources and decision-making as often found in head offices of 
large INGOs is at odds with the flexibility required to implement participatory capacity building 
that can move beyond skills-building as an end in of itself. Programming that INGO field staff 
feel is appropriate and programming encouraged by the head offices is not always compatible. 
The capacity-building manager of this INGO explained that getting those from head office ‘on 
board’ to the idea o f implementing capacity building programmes was a difficulty, which
Interview with refugee committee respondent 14JB, on file with author.
In the Karen and Karenni camps leaders are typically Christian. The Mon are primarily Buddhists. Muslims hold
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included having to find new development focused donors who would fund projects of that 
nature.*̂ ^
The handing over of genuine decision-making power to refugees in regards to resources
and agendas is still a challenge for many INGOs. As a young man in a Karenni refugee camp
explains, a top-down approach by NGOs in the camps is not beneficial to the people.
NGOs can’t solve our problems. People here think we have to rely 
on NGOs. .. But we have to understand each other, share our 
experiences [and] discuss how to do development... If  only one side 
makes decisions one side is controlled by the other.” ®
Refugee participants have also been concerned about the lack o f INGO follow-up once 
capacity-building training sessions are over. After being taught how to write proposals for 
funding and encouraged to submit them to this organisation’s small grants fund, only one out of 
eighteen proposals submitted was given a positive response for tentative funding.”  ̂ Capacity 
building in these cases has the potential to lead to increased fimstration as people are given skills 
in the camp setting, with little or no possibility o f utilising them under the relief-oriented 
assistance policies put into place by the Thai Government and implemented by INGOs.
A related challenge regarding the use o f resources as identified by refugee participants is 
the training of people through capacity building programs and then “snatching up the best and 
brightest” to work for the INGO. This is perceived by the community as undermining their 
efforts at starting and running their own indigenous organisations. An NGO staff member notes, 
“There are very few indigenous, intelligent, capable and interested people to work and these are 
the ones usually wearing 16 different hats, everyone wants them.”'®° Petras notes that INGOs 
hiring local refugee staff can be “diverting people fi-om their own struggles as they are seeonded
few leadership positions in either the Christian or Buddhist majority camps.
Hyndman (1996) referring to Giddens, as quoted in Harrell-Bond (1999) op. cit. p 158. 
Interview 26JB, on file with author.
Interview IJC, on file with author.
Interview I7JFN, on file with author.
Interview 4K, on file with author.
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to work for an external organisation.”'*’ However, for an international NGO, having competent, 
skilled Burmese staff can make their programming more responsive and appropriate for the 
community they are serving. To ensure more than just instrumental participation by refugee staff, 
INGOs must commit to participatory processes and decision-making that includes all staff.
The capacity building program of this international organisation has increased the skills 
and confidence among those trained. However, formally registered international NGOs continue 
to focus primarily on much needed services such as health care and education in order to meet 
basic needs of those in the camps. Their focus on humanitarian assistance as well as limited 
mandates and resources for capacity building programming mean that INGO capacity building 
programming remains at this time only a limited tool as a means to engage refugees as citizens in 
their struggles for change in Burma.
Local NGOs and Capacity Building as Empowerment
Local NGOs established in Thailand are usually smaller organisations (often run by non- 
Thais) with more long-term as well as Burmese staff and ‘an ear closer to the ground’.'*̂  
Individuals who have started these local organisations typically have previous experiences on the 
border or inside Burma. Some LNGO directors and staff have been in Thailand since the first 
influx of refugees in 1984 while others have volunteered and/or taught inside ethnic minority 
states in Burma or in the refugee camps before taking up their present posts.
In their efforts to provide capacity building to refugee groups, these NGOs are much less 
likely to go through official government channels and usually work more directly with those at 
the grassroots. LNGOs, though allowed few official fi-eedoms in Thailand, are in some ways less 
restricted in their activities than INGOs because they do not have to contend with distant head 
office directives and can tailor their programming directly to the needs of those with whom they
Petras, James (1997) “Imperialism and Monthly Review \o \. 49, p 25.
Although there are some non-registered Thai NGOs working on refugee issues, most focus on domestic issues. Thai
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are working. Agendas are more fluid and based on the expressed needs of the refugee groups.
Speaking of the reasons for her organisation’s move towards development programming, for
example, a LNGO director explains
Relief in itself is not very satisfactory, it’s just an emergency thing, 
and [the refugees] were looking long term. At that stage we had no 
experience in development at all. But given that they wanted it, 
whether or not we had the skills, we tried to find ways of addressing 
these needs.’*̂
Capacity building activities undertaken by LNGOs include teaching journalism, 
documentation and research of human rights and environmental abuses for both local and 
international advocacy efforts, peacebuilding workshops, community management courses 
deUvered via distance education and language training. Other projects have emerged as needs are 
identified. Providing a wide array of capacity building projects is not only more responsive, it 
also reaches a larger and wider range of participants. As the director o f a local organisation 
explains.
Basically we do capacity building -  assist any of the women’s groups 
to do whatever they want to do which is often small projects to 
generate income, projects to raise awareness amongst their members, 
like newsletters or publications, travel costs to go to meetings.
Anything to help them organise themselves which is really key 
because they are generally not getting that support from the men’s 
[refugee] organisations. Without that [support] they aren’t able to
184orgamse.
In this case, the ideas for the activities are emerging from the community, while the LNGO is 
acting as a catalyst (rather than a service provider) as outlined in Korten’s 3"* Generation strategy.
In another example, an objective o f one LNGO’s capacity building programme is to help 
refugees understand how NGOs and donors give assistance. Participants that learn to write 
proposals, talk to donors, identify programme objectives and appropriate activities have the skills
NGOs with official status to work in the camps are also restricted to providing humanitarian aid.
Interview with LNGO director, int 
Interview 5H, on file with author.
i erview 5H, on file with author.
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needed to start an independent group or organisation. The director of a long running LNGO in 
Chiang Mai notes, “Definitely the idea is to capacity build -  we just give the seed funds and 
then hopefully they can get direct fimding. We certainly have no plans to monopolise them.” *̂̂  
This fits well with Korten’s definition o f a second generation ‘developmental’ NGO acting as a 
mobiliser to the community with which it works. This particular LNGO assumes a partnership 
with the community and expects the members to work on implementation as well as decision­
making of projects and processes.
The ability of LNGOs to encourage the formation o f refugee-run NGOs through the 
prc^ramming provided and the processes adapted is one of their main successes. Enviromnental 
training in 1995 by a media-focused NGO resulted in the formation of Karermi Evergreen (KEG). 
A refugee-run organisation, their activities include environmental awareness activities, 
distributing environmental resources to camp residents and working with the Karermi education 
minister to incorporate environmental issues into the primary school curriculum. KEG is also 
attempting to raise awareness about the Salween Dam project, which will have huge 
enviromnental consequences inside Burma. Some members o f KEG have also volunteered with 
the Thai forestry department to help with reforestation activities. The activities o f the 
organisation are broad-based with tremendous potential to create a  more informed and 
environmentally active citizenry in Karenni areas. As the secretary of the organisation also notes, 
“Our younger generation is becoming more educated compared to the older generation. Now we 
have many more educated youth to get involved in NGO activities, so we will be more successful 
in the future.”
Other refugee-run organisations were formed after camp members received external 
training from other LNGOs. Members o f the Karenni News Agency for Human Rights, for 
instance, learned human rights research and documentation skills from a human rights and
Interview 5H, on file with author.
Interview witii KEG Secretary, interview lOJB, on file with author.
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environmental NGO and now publishes a newsletter for distribution within the camps and NGO 
community regarding human rights abuses. Their objective is to “expose human rights violations 
in Karenni state and make the international community aware o f the situation, [thereby] 
increasing international support for the Karenni people.”'*̂  In 2003, a member of this 
organisation along with two other colleagues who had also attended the same year-long training 
program in human rights and environmental issues started a similar training program based on the 
LNGO’s training curriculum. Called the ‘Social Development Centre’ and based inside their 
refugee camp, this program now reaches youth who would not otherwise have the opportunity to 
attend such a capacity building training.
LNGOs are able to utihse capacity building as a successftd strategy to encourage refugee 
initiatives. Though the programs are unable to reach the majority o f those in the camps, they are 
able to have a wider impact due to the establishment of similar programmes within the camps by 
refugee participants. Numerous LNGOs then provide small grants to help with start up costs and 
activities identified by the refugee communities and organisations. The establishment o f refugee- 
led initiatives is the objective of most LNGOs providing capacity building training on the border. 
With the skills to teach, farm, do research, provide medical care, and organise, among other 
skills, those in the camps are ensuring they can meet their own needs and work to create a just 
and sustainable community both in the camps and after their return to Burma.
Challenges fo r Local (unregistered) NGOs
Although LNGOs are able to successfully implement a variety of capacity building 
programs, problems remain for those that are not officially registered with the Thai government. 
These include difficulties accessing the camps and therefore unreliable communication uncertain 
timelines for projects, and finally, general fear and insecurity.
Interview 30HB, on file with author.
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With mandates that go beyond relief, most LNGOs are unable to gain official permission
to enter and work in the refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border. This lack of access to the
camp population makes communication much more difficult. Scheduling of meetings and travel
in or out of the camps is difficult, particularly since the relocation of Karenni Camp 3 and Mae
Khong Kha Camp further away fi’om Thai towns and closer to the border. Oftentimes capacity
building programmes (particularly long-term trainings) must take place outside of the camps.
This results in high transportation and security costs since the participants are considered illegal
once outside of the refugee camps.’** For capacity building activities held outside the camps,
security continues to be a problem as Thai military and police often stop people to check their
identity documents. During extended training programs in Thai towns or cities, the potential for
participants to be arrested is a constant worry. An LNGO worker explains her experience;
Right from the beginning we were working with [Burmese] 
students who were arrested the whole time by the Thai police.
And up till now, it’s just hit or miss. For example, this workshop 
we’ve just arranged. Are they going to be arrested on the way 
there, on the way back? Is it going to be shut down? ... And the 
costs of funding anything like that are doubled, because you 
have to pay security, fines, etc....the costs are doubled and the 
stress is doubled, so that’s bad.’*̂
A related challenge is the inability to openly assist refugee participants if  they are 
arrested. In such cases, the participant’s political organisation is called upon to assist. Large 
fines must usually be paid to the police and if  not, the person will remain in custody or be 
deported. This is also the case for staff of local NGOs. In addition, during politically sensitive 
times in Thailand, such as during international meetings with the Asian Development Bank, 
unregistered NGOs are cautioned to close down in order to avoid ‘visits’ by Thai authorities.
Under the current government administration, with attitudes shifting favourably towards the Burmese military junta, 
Thai policies are changing and it is much more difficult to arrange for transportation for refugees to participate in 
trainings or meetings outside of the refugee camps. There have been recent incidences where Thai intelligence will 
provide a travel pass to a refugee. However, upon reaching a military checkpoint, the pass has been rejected and 
onward travel denied by the soldiers on duty. (Personal communication with Karen colleague, 2004.)
Interview 5H, on file with author.
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With unexpected events such as these, with plans and schedules changing at a moment’s notice, 
local NGO staff must remain flexible and open to change.
Refugee-organised NGOs: Successes and Challenges
Refugee-organised NGOs and community-based organisations also face many challenges
as well as successes in their work. The first issue is similar to unregistered NGOs, and that is the
inability to travel and work outside the camp freely. Another major challenge for refugee
organisations includes the issue of outside control. Adequate funding can be extremely difficult
to secure for refugee organisations, despite the purported prevalence of international
organisations willing to help those at the grassroots. A refugee organisation that has started a
program to “empower through education and increase the participation o f women in decision
making and politics” has found funding extremely difficult to obtain. A volunteer with this
refugee organisation explains
We have only tenuous funding for the project. As with all 
indigenous group-initiated projects it is very difficult to find 
funding. [IjNGOs have it coming out of their ears but we are 
told to go through NGOs [because] donors give it to them rather 
than refugee groups directly - and most [NGOs] keep it for their 
own projects that they ‘do on’ the refugees
The challenge for refugee-organised NGOs to gain legitimacy and be perceived as 
accountable in the eyes of INGOs and donors rooted in a relief framework also remains 
substantial. In light of this reality, some refugee organisations have begun to coordinate their 
efforts at fundraising and co-operation. The following is one such example.
Personal communication with a volunteer working with an ethnic women’s organisation on the Thai-Burmese 
border, June 2001.
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The Karenni NGO Coordination Committee
In 1999 Karenni NGOs formed the Karenni NGO Coordination Committee (KNCC) in 
order to work on joint projects and fundraising initiatives. The member organisations had the 
support of a solidarity organisation from the Philippines to assist them with outlining their goals 
and objectives. Though the process was guided by the outside facilitator, the decisions and 
outcomes of the planning sessions were those o f the coordinating committee. KNCC objectives 
include; identifying, developing and implementing joint initiatives that will ensure the delivery of 
services for Karenni peoples; facilitate information exchanges, capacity building, and resources to 
develop and strengthen strategies and action to empower member NGOs as well as the people in 
the communities; facilitate coordination of local [Karenni] NGO activities; building partnerships 
and solidarity efforts with individuals and organisations (both governmental and non­
governmental) working in the promotion o f issues such as justice, peace, human rights and 
democracy locally and internationally.
According to a KNGO member, “Before the KNCC was formed, [international] NGOs
went to individuals in a camp [to propose projects] and there was no control and it was confusing.
With the KNCC duplication can be avoided.”'̂  ̂ Other members noted that it is “better [for
KNGOs] to work together because our aims are all focusing on the Karermi people.”'̂  ̂ The
creation of the KNCC has led to KNGOs consolidating their strength and resources. With the
skills and knowledge gained from a variety of NGOs, they are now more able to write proposals,
implement their own projects, and also to train and educate others in these areas. One member,
however, explains the difficulties o f coming together to form the committee.
If we all have the same idea, same knowledge, it is possible [to 
coordinate]. But maybe, probably in my head, we have different 
ideas... So all people they should [be] convince[d] that the KNCC 
is the coordinating body. If they not understand, [they will expect] 
more than this... They [also] have to think about the policy of the
KNCC Brochure, 2000.
Interview 14JB, on file with author. 
Interview 30H, on file with author.
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KNPP. If you do according to your [organisation’s] constitution it 
will be OK. If  you don’t . . .maybe you will have conflict.’̂ '*
The member organisations of the KNCC have varying levels of association with the
Karenni Government and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). Some KNGOs were
formed after participating in INGO training but others such as the KNWO were formed under the
party structure and have only more recently received international training and assistance as an
indigenous NGO. The relationship between these groups and the KNPP remains intertwined, as
many NGO directors hold posts within the government. A member o f the KNPP explains the
political structure
The KNPP leader is elected and then the leader appoints the leader 
o f the Karenni Government [which operates in the refugee camps].
KNPP controls and monitors the government. Some areas in 
Karenni State are still controlled by the KNPP.'®^
The Karenni NGO Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (KNMEC), as part o f the
Karenni Government, as its name suggests, monitors the work of the KNGOs that operate under
the umbrella o f the KNCC. As the KNMEC secretary explains
[Karenni] NGOs are all familiar with [KNPP] party policies.... We 
don’t mean to control, we are just watching their activities to see if 
they work properly or not. Because sometimes some projects or 
proposals can clash with Karenni foreign policy.’̂ ®
Engaged in a war against their assimilation, the Karenni leadership maintains that there is 
little room for dissent among the diverse population that make up the Karenni camps. The 
Karenni have maintained their own camp administrative system, which according to some 
scholars has been an integral factor leading to high levels of refugee participation.’̂  ̂ This is 
evident specifically in the health and education sectors where the INGOs working in these areas
Interview with KNCC member, interview 11JA, on file with author.
Interview with KNPP official, interview 18J, on file with author.
Interview with KNPP official, ibid.
Bowles, Edith (1997) Assistance, Protection, and Policy in Refugee Camps on the Thailand-Burma Border: An 
Overview, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University.
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do so in partnership with their Karenni government counterparts. Although the advantages of 
refugee structures being maintained cannot be denied, the hierarchies that existed in these 
societies before they came to Thailand still, for the most part, exist in the camps. According to 
Bowles
Those who are economically better off, politically well 
connected, or religiously affiliated with powerful groups (these 
factors are not necessarily synonymous), have often had 
disproportionate access to resources. They tend to be better 
educated and speak English.*’*
NGOs wanting to ensure representation o f all sectors of the society in their programmes 
may find this difficult to achieve as the Karenni leadership operates according to traditional 
hierarchies o f age, education and kinship ties. The KNPP’s selection criteria for participants 
wanting to take part in (non-refugee) NGO programming typically includes looking at one’s 
character, skills (such as language abilities and education), and patriotism, defined as their 
interest and commitment to work for their people.*”
Entrenched hierarchies within a society are difficult to break down, even by insiders. 
Yet, by addressing the issue o f power relations within the camp setting, people become aware of 
the hierarchies and power structures under which they currently operate. These may not have 
been previously questioned within the society, at least not easily or openly. A foreign NGO 
worker who began her work with the Karen at the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw in the late 
1980s explains,
...young people...are often sidelined; old people want to stay in 
power. Fundamental things, [such as] how we view 
organisations, reverence for hierarchy, elites etc., needs to be 
overcome. It could be ten years of operating in relative 
“freedom” before some of these things can be changed.̂ ****
Bowles, (1997) op. cit.198
Interview with KNPP official, interview 27J, on file with author.
Interview 4K, on file with author.
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Because the Karenni, as other ethnic nationality groups, are resisting unequal and 
repressive power relations with the Burmese government authorities, examining this issue openly 
may increase the number of citizens involved in the community’s own decision making 
structures. Refugee-organised NGOs run by people already in power (namely positions of 
political leadership) tend to maintain these traditional structures.
The role of independent refugee organisations (able to act separately from their ethnic 
governments) has grown and is considered a challenge to established power structures. Some 
groups that have emerged have been trained by an NGO that aims to help refugees “develop the 
skills necessary to participate in their communities as informed, involved citizens.” ®̂' Though 
these groups are small, many are ethnically and religiously diverse and are implementing then- 
own programming, including training others in the camps and operating independently from the 
political leadership in the community. The formation of these independent, decentralised groups 
who are working towards social change is a significant achievement for organisations wanting to 
assist those at the grassroots through capacity building programmes. Furthermore, the emergence 
of these organisations is a testimony to the ability of refugees to work as citizens towards a 
common social vision while the independence of these organisations ensures that the members 
are active participants in the processes intended to improved and transform their communities.
Solidarity Linkages
Within a participatory development framework, building solidarity and connections 
among refugee groups as well as with overseas groups and communities is a useful way to share 
ideas, research and strategies, hi addition, such linkages can raise awareness regarding the 
difficulties o f life in exile and provides opportunities to contemplate the current challenges as 
well as potential solutions. All the components of participatory development (working to change 
policies and institutions, encouraging initiatives in support o f common vision and active
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participation) can be incorporated into solidarity work.
Clear examples o f solidarity linkages by relief-mandated NGOs doing traditional relief
activities or capacity building were not discovered during the field research. Solidarity work is
encouraged by a small number o f local organisations however. One LNGO has played an
instrumental role in catalyzing refugee-led development groups from Burma and the border areas
to come together and learn from the experiences o f the others. The activities o f  these groups are
risky and complicated, such as clandestinely crossing the border into Burma to provide assistance
to IDPs. Being all from Burma, working in similar contexts, the learning and sharing was
particularly relevant for these organisations. A Burmese 6cilitator of the seminar noted
This is a  first time experiment, to explain our groups to one 
another, to field questions and to try to understand what we 
ourselves are doing... the international speakers are useful, but 
the local knowledge shared [is the] most exciting.^°^
Involving development organisations from six ethnic groups/committees that are all 
working in different regions, the knowledge and action emerging out o f their work is tremendous. 
A participant noted, “There is a certain amount o f energy in the air, people working for solutions, 
really challenging one another and doing things that they believe in.” °̂̂  Activities included 
sharing of experiences, guest speakers and workshops on evaluation and development theory and 
visits to NGO projects within Thailand. The fecilitative role of the organisers also contributed to 
the success of the seminar. In this case, they provided funding and logistical support, but 
encouraged the refugee groups to take the lead in presentations and information-sharing activities. 
By encouraging facilitation by the refugee organisations rather than the LNGO, the sharing can 
be more empowering for the participants.
Organisations with a  gendered perspective and mandates that deal with women’s rights 
have also been very active in solidarity efforts. A local NGO involved in action research has
Personal communication with seminar facilitator, 24JFN, on file with author. 
“ ^Ibid.
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been part of a process to include ethnic minority women in international discussions regarding the 
plight o f refugee women from Burma. Invited by the international CED AW committee and 
funded by a local NGO, a member from each Burmese woman’s organisation on the border 
attended the meeting and spoke about their plight to an international audience.^®'' Prior to 
attending these international meetings, the same NGO conducted workshops on the CED AW with 
women from the camps and interviewed more than 300 women about the situation inside Burma. 
In addition, a CEDAW shadow report highlighting the plight of ethnic minority women in Burma 
was written with NGO support by representatives from five women’s organisations based on the 
Thai-Burma border.^®^
Another example of a solidarity effort by refugee women is the monthly “Women’s
Exchange.” Funded by an Australian donor and facilitated by an LNGO, meetings are held in
various locations along the border for refugee and migrant women to share their experiences as
well as create awareness and solidarity linkages among them. Dedicated to women’s
empowerment, these meetings are flexible and open to democratic decision-making processes.
Each month a different woman takes responsibility for facilitating the meeting. The interaction
between the women and the sharing of ideas helps to overcome the traditional mistrust between
various ethnic groups. It also provides a space for the voices of women within the traditionally
male dominated refugee organisations. The coordinator of the programme explains
These meetings...are linking women of different ethnic groups and 
backgrounds.... The Women’s Exchange is a monthly meeting to 
motivate people, [to encourage] critical thinking. The women can 
go back to their own groups, as they want, to do action.^®*
Other NGOs have been involved with research that is taken to international conferences
^  Ibid.
Interview 4K, on file with author.
The member organisations include the Karen and Karenni Women’s Organisations, the Burmese Women’s Union, 
the Shan Women’s Action Network and the Tavoyan Women’s Union. See; Women’s Organizations of Burma’s 
Shadow Report Writing Committee (2000) “Burma: The Current State of Women -  Conflict Area Specific” A Shadow 
R ^o r t to the 22'“̂  Session o f  CEDA W (http://www.soros.orgA)urma/burmadebate/winter99report.html. 24 April 2000) 
Interview with local NGO director, interview IK, on file with author.
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and meetings in order to provide up-to-date information to decision-makers. Given the lack of 
accurate information that comes out o f Burma, these researchers provide a vital role for policy 
makers who would otherwise not have access to accurate information. This also builds direct 
connections between the refugee organisations and policy makers in other countries. Building up 
direct connections between refugee constituents and others provides a way for voices to be heard, 
opinions expressed and taken into account when decisions are made by foreign policy makers.
The next example reveals the strength of inter-refugee camp solidarity and cooperation,
which emerged out of an unmet need and a donor’s ‘mobiliser’ approach. In response to
restrictions on the cutting of trees in or near the refugee camps, refugees have faced significant
hardship due to the ensuing shortage o f fuel and building supplies. In response, the Burmese
Border Consortium began to provide limited amounts o f bamboo and charcoal to the residents of
the camps. Yet those located at higher elevations, such as people living in the Umphiem Mae
refugee camp, reported that the fuel received was insufficient to meet their needs. In this case the
relief agency looked to a UNHCR fuel consultant to determine if  it was necessary to provide
more charcoal. The refugees, meanwhile, requiring more fuel to cook their food and to stay
warm in the cold season, came up with their own coping strategies. As a Karen woman explains.
They give the charcoal, but it’s not enough and it is crushed. But 
we use our brain, we mix the charcoal powder with the rice 
liquid, we make a ball, we put it in the sun. When it’s dry we use 
i t .^
In 1997, after KnRC members worked out a system for making charcoal with locally 
available materials and means, a stove-making project was initiated by the Karenni Refugee 
Committee in response to the continuing fuel shortages in the camps. More energy efficient than 
cooking over an open flame, 5000 clay stoves were produced and distributed to families in the 
Karenni camps. Funded by the Canada Fund for Displaced Burmese in Thailand, (CF) the project 
has been highly praised by fuel experts and has contributed to the well-being of the refugee
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communities. Also, given the similar needs of refugees all along the border, the project soon
spread from the Karenni camps down to Karen camps. As the CF co-ordinator explains
This project started in the Karenni camps and even though these 
camps are very far apart there is a great jungle telephone,... So 
the northern Karen camps found out about this and said, “We 
like this idea, can we do it too?” So the northern Karen Refugee 
Committee applied [for funding] and they were able to go up to 
the Karenni camps to do a study tour and actually learned how 
they were doing it, learned the system and then brought it back 
[to their camps]
This refugee-led process results in better assessment o f needs and more creative and
appropriate solutions to commonly identified problems. In addition, besides encouraging
solidarity among the refugee committees, the project also meets the criteria o f a successful
capacity building activity. Providing funding without an NGO intermediary the donor notes,
...w e’ve really tried to work directly with the refugee 
committees because they have to be responsible and they have to 
own the projects. You can’t build someone’s edacity  to do that 
unless you give them the responsibility as well.^
In these cases, where the communities already possess a solution to their problem and 
want to share the idea with other communities, the role of a ‘hands-off donor, working as a 
catalyst rather than a service provider, thereby respecting the need for local control o f the process, 
is empowering and participatory for refugee groups.
Other initiatives in the camps have encouraged international solidarity linkages, including 
an organisation that promotes south-south solidarity through internships for refugee activists and 
assisting KNGOs with the formation o f its coordination committee. A local NGO also promotes 
linkages between refugee and European students, providing scholarships for some students to 
receive higher education outside the camp. The effects of such linkages are great, with the flow 
of information going both ways. Furthermore, solidarity linkages are a key to acknowledging the
Interview 8G, on file with author.
Interview with Christine Munro, Coordinator of the Canada Fund for Displaced Burmese in Thailand, interview
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struggles o f refugee communities and learning how they cope and organise. Falling within the 4* 
Generation strategy, outsiders learning and knowing about the struggles o f displaced citizens 
from Burma are more likely to make efforts to influence their own govermnent’s policies towards 
the Burmese military regime. Solidarity linkages are being used as a tool for refugee groups to 
put active pressure on decision-makers and institutions working on Burma issues.
To sum up, this chapter has examined the processes and programming undertaken in the 
camps by different types of NGOs in order to assess their ability to engage in activities promoting 
‘citizen action’ by refugees. The first finding was that external government poHcies limit the 
types o f programming officially allowed in the camps and with the refugee communities. Despite 
this, INGOs with relief-focused mandates are still able to implement capacity building programs 
that build up the skills and participation o f refugee leaders within die camps. This has led to 
engaged and mobilised community leaders better able to run government departments such as 
schools and health clinics. A challenge is their abihty to gain official mandates to do 
programming that extends beyond relief activities. Furthermore, INGOs tend to use well- 
established networks to choose participants and therefore the diversity o f those participating in 
their capacity-building activities usually remains limited to leaders and those connected to people 
with power in the camp communities.
Local NGOs working on the Thai-Burma border often are not registered with the Thai 
government. This gives these LNGOs less security, unstable work environments and less access 
to the refugee communities. On the other hand, they are not restricted in their programming 
because they have no official (government approved) mandate. Therefore, LNGOs are more 
likely to act as catalysts and provide capacity-building trainings that go fer beyond a relief 
mandate. Refugee participants of LNGO programs are more diverse than those attending INGO 
training programs and afterwards these refugee participants often start their own independent 
organisations that work on issues such as cormnunity building, enviromnental protection, human
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rights and advocacy. Another benefit o f these trainings is the long-term impact of these refugee- 
run organisations providing capacity building programs in their own communities (in the refiigee 
camps or inside Burma) with a much wider range o f participants.
The formation o f refugee-run and organised NGOs is an indication that NGOs have used 
a participatory development finmework. Once formed, however, these groups face the challenge 
o f finding adequate resources to carry out their work. Another issue is creating a new, 
independent relationship with the NGO that provided the initial capacity building. Some (but not 
all) of these groups also struggle to break out of the hierarchical structures that are still in place 
within their communities.
Solidarity linkages and connections are also a  strategy to encourage ‘citizen action’ 
among refugee communities. INGOs, in this case study, did not undertake solidarity work on any 
significant level. LNGOs and locally based donors were more active in promoting solidarity 
linkages. Refugee to refugee linkages occurred along the border which led to more relevant and 
appropriate solutions for refugee groups implementing their own programming. It also improved 
cooperation and respect between various ethnic communities fi'om Burma. Links between 
refugees and foreign citizens led to greater international awareness of the current situation for 
refugees as well as encouraged policy decisions that challenged the Burmese regime. The 
following concluding chapter will link these findings to the Uterature presented in chapter One.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions and Recommendations
This study has examined the roles of international, local and refugee-run (local) 
nongovernmental organisations assisting the more than 140,000 refugees living along the Thai- 
Burmese border, looking specifically at the possibilities, challenges and outcomes o f using 
participatory development processes. The literature presented argued that the international 
refiigee regime, which treats refugees as passive recipients of aid, is inadequate. The view 
advocated is that refugees are necessary change agents in dealh^ with the conflicts that have led 
to their displacement. NGOs working within a participatory development framework will 
encourage citizen action by refugees. The participatory development fi-amework created to 
evaluate NGO activities and processes were based on the ideas o f Korten and Macdonald and 
acknowledged the need for refugee action as citizen/social change agent. Field research 
conducted on the Thai-Burma border for five months in 2000 as well as observations and 
experience while working with an NGO in Thailand for the past two years provided the evidence 
for this study.
CONCLUSIONS
The UNHCR, the UN refugee protection agency, through its programming on the Thai- 
Burma border sees refugees and displacement as problems to be solved. The agency’s bilateral 
discussions with the Thai and Burmese governments focus on national-level policies and 
agreements. Meetings with camp leaders or other refugees do not occur and the protection o f 
refugees by the UNHCR on this border has been minimal Camps have closed, been relocated 
and plans are being made for repatriation without the consultation o f refugee groups. This lack o f 
dialogue is a serious limitation that overlooks the energy and enthusiasm refugees can contribute 
to addressing the problems they fece. The UNHCR continues to operate fi’om the worldview that 
displacement is a situation solely characterised by the need for relief and emergency aid. Refugee
-  86 -
participation as political or social change agents bas not been integrated into UNHCR 
programming.
International NGOs working on the Thai-Burma border and operating with the 
permission of the Thai government have extremely limited Memorandums of Understanding 
which restrict the types of programming they can provide to refugees. Only relief and 
maintenance programming by INGOs are allowed in the refugee camps. This limitation on 
programming reinforces the idea of refugee as non-citizen. Camp inhabitants are treated as 
passive recipients o f humanitarian aid without choice or involvement in the assistance policies 
impacting their day-to-day survival.
Nonetheless, within the firameworik provided by the Thai authorities, international health 
and education organisations have worked to include training and upgrading of skills for medics, 
teachers and camp leaders. The participants of these capacity-building programs usually reach 
those that are better educated and come from positions of power or leadership within the cairq) 
setting. The participation that takes place is instrumental, resulting in programs better run with 
skilled refugee staff. Overall the INGOs on this border are restricted by their mandates and 
continue to operate within the mainstream reUef paradigm. Although they have included more 
moves towards participatory development through limited capacity-building, refugee responses 
and solutions to conflict and displacement are not emphasised. Refrigees in the camps, for the 
most part, continue to be viewed as recipients of aid rather than social change agents.
Local nongovernmental organisations have provided the most successful examples of 
using participatory development on the Thai-Burma border. Their capacity building and other 
programs have led to the formation of numerous independent, refugee-led organisations. 
Working outside official government channels, LNGOs have responded to the needs of refugee 
communities by engaging them as partners in the struggle for social, political and environmental 
change. Programming decisions are made in collaboration with the communities and are tailored 
to meet their expressed needs. Displacement is not viewed as the principal problem but rather a
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side effect o f the wider conflicts and struggles that those from Burma are feeing. Given this 
approach, training programs on topics such as politics, foreign afifeirs, the enviroiunent, human 
rights, journalism, peacebuilding, community organising, among others, are offered. Trainers are 
often from the refugee communities themselves and teach in Burmese. Participants come from 
more diverse backgrounds than those involved in INGO training programs. The skills gained are 
used by the participants to assess and work on the issues with their communities in exile and 
inside Burma.
Local NGOs continue to fece challenges, however, and must be careful o f their own 
safety and that o f their refugee participants. The political setting in Thailand makes assisting 
refugees in this way uncertain and risky. Thai government policies fluctuate but as they become 
less refugee-friendly, the ability o f LNGOs to engage in participatory development programming 
becomes more limited. In previous times of more explicit government acceptance o f refugees on 
Thai sod, NGOs were more easily able to institute participatory programming conducive to 
citizen action.
The emergence and growth o f refugee-run and organised NGOs is solid proof o f the 
ability o f refugees to function as citizens. Assisted in part by organisations that promote citizen 
action through participatory development, these newly formed organisations are now conducting 
cross-border medical assistance to IDPs in Burma, documenting human rights abuses, and 
participating in irrtemational solidarity activities and broader debates regarding their displacement 
and political reform in Burma. Their actions contribute to social change within the camps and in 
Burma, which will continue when they, as citizens, return home.
Referring to the thesis of this study, it is concluded that NGOs working with refugees can 
successfolly implement a participatory development framework. Organisations that do so are 
more able to encourage and engage refugees as socially active citizens working towards change in 
their communities. Refugee organisations have also refused to limit their activities to relief and 
together with these LNGOs have allowed the refugee canqrs on the Thai-Burma border to become
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‘a time and place for growth’. Upon return to Burma, those involved in refugee organisations, 
LNGO programs, as well as member of the refugee government departments, will have the skills 
and experience necessary to participate as members o f the Burmese polity. It is my hope that 
NGOs in other refugee settings will also work to acknowledge the strength and commitment of 
those who have been displaced and work to engage them as partners in the struggle for change.
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R ec o m m en d a t io n s
The following recommendations are provided for those nongovernmental organisations,
multilateral and government agencies working to improve their programming and processes in
order to recognise the dignity and rights o f all refiigees and displaced persons on the Thai-Burma
border.
To the International and Local NGOs operating on the Thai Burma border:
• Consult with and support existing refugee organisations whenever possible.
• Encourage the formation o f refugee-run organisations through capacity building and other 
training programs. Lobby the Thai government for expanded mandates that include such 
programming.
• Assist refugee organisations with fundraising efforts and when possible create links between 
one’s funding sources and local refiigee groups who have less access to outside funding 
opportunities.
• Promote refugee participation in policy discussions and international advocacy efforts 
concerning the political and humanitarian situation in Burma. Arrange for meetings to occur 
in settings where refugee participation is possible. Assist refugee representatives with travel 
costs and arrangements to meetings if necessary.
•  Encourage the UNHCR to take a more active role in protection issues for both border and 
urban refugees. NGOs should push the UNHCR to see refiigees, not only host governments, 
as stakeholders in the processes affecting their futures and urge the UNHCR to continue 
monitoring the situation o f refugees, including those that have been forced back to Burma and 
remain near the border in IDF camps.
To the UNHCR:
• Publicly object to the forced repatriation efforts of Burmese refugees by the Burmese and 
Thai governments.
• Object to the Thai government’s relocation o f refiigee camps to less secure locations closer to 
the Burmese border and SPDC troops.
• Monitor the camp relocations to ensure that the rights o f the refiigees are being respected.
• Assist refugees that have been detained by the Thai authorities for travelling outside the 
refiigee camps. Encourage the Thai government to allow freedom of movement for Burmese 
refugees in Thailand.
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• Encourage the Thai government to grant refiigee status and assistance to all refugees from 
Burma, particularly Shan refugees who have until now been denied any assistance by the 
Thai government.
• Monitor the amount o f assistance being provided by NGOs in the camps and ensure that it is 
adequate for survival. Provide additional funding to NGOs if  they are unable to provide 
sufficient food supplies and building materials.
• Implement training programs and income generation projects in the camps using a 
participatory development fiamework.
e Dialogue with Thai human rights organisations to ensure Thai nationals as well as 
international organisations place pressure in the government to respect the human rights of 
refugees.
To the Royal Thai Government:
• Allow international and Thai NGOs mandates beyond humanitarian assistance to Burmese 
refugees (both border and urban cases).
•  Allow access to the camps by NGO workers and others, including trainers, teachers, and the 
media.
• Provide refugees with a legal means to obtain travel documents in order to attend meetings, 
trainings and conferences as needed.
•  Include refugee communities in major decisions regarding policies and future plans that will 
affiect them (for example, camp relocations and rq>atriation).
•  Respect the Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees and do not force refugees on Thai 
soil to return to Burma until the conditions fisr repatriation have been met.
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